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Abstract
The early German romantics Hölderlin,  Novalis,  and Schlegel were united in
their attempt to combine idealism and realism. However, contemporary interpretations
of early German romanticism have, as far as idealism and realism is concerned, found
two major  strands  of  interpretation  in  Manfred  Frank  and  Frederick  C.  Beiser  that
respectively characterise the romantics as epistemological and metaphysical realists and
as absolute idealists. Against both of these interpretations I will argue that we both can
and should interpret the Frühromantiker as finding some middle path between idealism
and realism. In order to motivate this claim I will begin by summarising what I take to
be  the  main  features  of  the  positions  of  the  three  major  early  German  romantics
(Hölderlin, Novalis, and Schlegel) as well as making it apparent that finding some way
of combining idealism and realism was in fact their goal. In light of these features I will
then  critique  both  Frank  and  Beiser's  one-sided  interpretations  as  well  as  offer  an
interpretation that does take into account the romantics' self-proclaimed aim. Having
gone through Hölderlin, Novalis, and Schlegel in turn, summarised the major elements
of their  philosophy,  shown how the three can be interpreted as neither idealists  nor
realists, and rejected any absolute idealist readings, as well as having given a reading of
these philosophers consistent with their attempt to combine idealism and realism, I will
end by concluding that we both can and should interpret the Frühromantiker as finding
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Contemporary  interpretations  of  early  German  romanticism  have,  as  far  as
idealism and realism is concerned, found two major strands of interpretation in Manfred
Frank and Frederick C. Beiser. While Manfred Frank interprets Hölderlin, Novalis, and
Schlegel as epistemological and metaphysical realists Beiser's interpretation locates the
early development of absolute idealism in the early romantic movement. Against both of
these  interpretations  I  will  argue  that  we  both  can  and  should  interpret  the
Frühromantiker as finding some middle path between idealism and realism. In order to
motivate this claim I will begin by summarising what I take to be the main features of
the  positions  of  the  three  major  early  German  romantics  (Hölderlin,  Novalis,  and
Schlegel) as well as making it apparent that finding some way of combining idealism
and realism was in fact their goal. In light of these features I will then critique both
Frank and Beiser's one-sided interpretations as well as offer an interpretation that does
take  into  account  the  romantics'  self-proclaimed aim.  Insofar  as  Beiser  and  Frank's
interpretations  do  not  take  into  account  the  aims  of  the  movement  they attempt  to
characterise, and insofar as an interpretation that takes into account this aim and sees the
romantics as in some way accomplishing this aim is possible, I will conclude that we
both can and should take the early German romantics as finding some middle ground
between idealism and realism.1
Although  the  early German  romantic  movement  is  mostly  characterisable  in
1 Although there exists a wide range of interpretations of the Early German Romantics I will be 
focusing mainly on the interpretations of Frank and Beiser while making references to additional 
secondary literature on the subject. The reason for this is twofold. First of all, in recent years the 
interpretations that Frank and Beiser provide have emerged as two opposed but major poles of thought
regarding the Frühromantiker, and therefore represent two distinct but widely regarded ways of 
interpreting Hölderlin, Novalis, and Schlegel. Second, both of these interpretations, stressing either 
the realist or idealist aspects of romanticism, get something wrong in their interpretations in a way that
helps us to better understand their philosophical aims and texts. By understanding the shortcomings of
any interpretation that does not take into proper account the romantics' aim of finding a middle path 
between idealism and realism we can better understand how they attempted to do so.
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terms of the originality of its writers, there are some features that remain consistent
across the three writers we will be looking at. The first of these is a commitment to the
absolute. Whether it was as a pre-supposition of consciousness or of reality, or even
merely a regulative ideal, Hölderlin, Novalis, and Schlegel all held some conception of
the absolute as ultimate reality.  This commitment was accompanied by a scepticism
about our ability to know this absolute as either the condition of consciousness which
can therefore not appear to consciousness itself, or as that which, as infinite, can never
be adequately represented by a finite intellect. Because of this scepticism the romantics
also  held  that  the  philosophical  process  itself  could  only  be  one  of  infinite
approximation. If knowledge of the absolute is impossible all we can ever hope to do is
to approximate such knowledge in a never-ending process. Most importantly, the early
romantics were also unified in their attempt to combine what they saw as the partial
viewpoints of idealism and realism, the explicit statements of which we will see in the
next few chapters.
It is on this basis that we will critique both Frank and Beiser's interpretations.
Frank's interpretation stresses the realist aspect of early German romantic thought at the
expense of both this aim and the idealistic aspects that we also find in their writings.
However, as we will see, Frank's interpretation is based on definitions of idealism that
prejudge the issue against any attempt to combine the two and as such do not engage
properly with the self-proclaimed aims of the movement he attempts to characterise. In
addition,  the grounds on which Frank establishes the realism of the  Frühromantiker,
namely their rejection of the self-sufficiency of consciousness, rests on an asymmetry
between  idealism  and  realism,  and  consciousness  and  Being,  whose  exposition
precludes  the  possibility  of  ascribing  the  movement  a  realism based  purely  on  its
rejection of idealism. Furthermore, Frank's account also relies on a mischaracterisation
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of the notion of reality found in the writings of the Frühromantiker.
On the other hand, Beiser's interpretation, which stresses the organicist, Platonic,
and absolute idealist aspects of the movement, while not entirely guilty of ignoring the
aims of the movement, falters instead in his strong anti-sceptical and absolute idealist
interpretation. As we will see, the consistent scepticism across the three early German
romantics speaks entirely against their characterisation as absolute idealists precisely
because the possibility of absolute knowledge, an essential feature of absolute idealism,
is categorically rejected by all three. Since they expressly distinguished themselves from
absolute idealism in its most basic position they therefore can not be subsumed under
the general development of this movement. Even in the philosopher whose affinities
most closely resemble the organicist characterisation that Beiser provides, namely in
Novalis, we will see that such claims are to be taken with reservations that again speak
against such a characterisation in absolute terms. 
As we will see, it is precisely in the equiprimordiality of the subjective and the
objective, the respective starting points of idealism and realism, entirely unified in the
Frühromantiker notion  of  Being,  that  we  locate  the  romantics'  attempt  to  combine
idealism and  realism.  For  Hölderlin  the  subject-object  distinction  finds  its  original
ground in the Being that precedes it and out which the division first occurs. We also find
that reality itself is a product of this division and this opposition such that reality is as
independent  as  it  is  dependent  on  both  consciousness  and  objects,  meaning  his
philosophy  could  neither  be  said  to  be  a  form of  idealism or  realism,  but  only  a
combination  of  the  two.  In  Novalis,  we  will  find  that  the  incompleteness  of  both
idealism and  realism,  and  their  necessary  completion  in  each  other,  and  thus  their
relativisation, is an essential feature of our attempt to understand the absolute. By this
relativisation Novalis shows how neither idealism nor realism can be subsumed under
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the other, and how neither can be said to the primary to the other. This, in combination
with their being the primary elements of philosophy, means that Novalis could only be
said to be providing a philosophy which combines the two. Lastly, in Schlegel, we again
find that reality itself is only found in the indifference point of the equiprimordial ur-
elements of philosophy, namely, the infinite and consciousness, requiring a combination
that also means a combination of both of idealism and realism.2
Having gone through Hölderlin, Novalis, and Schlegel in turn, summarised the
major  elements  of  their  philosophy,  shown  how  the  three  can,  due  to  the
equiprimordiality of the subjective and the objective, be interpreted as neither an idealist
or realist, and rejected any absolute idealist readings, as well as given a reading of these
philosophers  consistent  with  their  attempt  to  combine  idealism and  realism,  I  will
conclude that we both can and should interpret the Frühromantiker as finding a middle
path between idealism and realism.
2 Although the identification of the starting points of idealism and realism as the subjective and 
objective places the Frühromantiker in the context of Fichte's definitions of Dogmatism and Idealism 
(wherein an attempt is made to make the basis of an explanation of experience the thing-in-itself or an 
intelligence respectively), the attempt of the Frühromantiker to combine idealism and realism places 
them also within the context of contemporary debates of realism and anti-realism, and offer an 
original insight into the nature of reality and the relation between mind and world (I, 426). 
Contemporary realism can broadly be defined as both an existence and an independence claim. To be a
realist about X is to take X to both exist and be independent of our thoughts about it (Miller, 2014). 
On the other hand anti-realists about X would admit its existence but not its independence (Miller, 
2014). There are also forms of non-realism which dispute the existence claim itself, such as 
eliminativism and non-cognitivism (Miller, 2014).  Insofar as the early romantics were committed to a
belief in the absolute they clearly fit into the existence element of realism. However, the question of 
just how independent ultimate reality is of our thoughts about it is not as clear. As we will discuss in 
the chapter on Hölderlin, and which applies equally to Novalis and Schlegel, we find that the world of 
objects is as dependent on mind as mind is on it, as subjectivity and objectivity can only arise in 
opposition to each other. In a strict sense this is a form of dependence, however it is not the sort of 
dependence that is characteristically thought of in relation to idealism, as it is not simply a one-way 
dependence.
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Chapter 1 - Realism and Idealism in Hölderlin
In this chapter I will show why Hölderlin both can and should be read not as a
realist or idealist, but instead as finding some middle ground between the two. I will
begin with some excerpts which make it clear that it was in fact Hölderlin's aim to find
some way of combining idealism and realism. We will then turn to the texts in full. The
foundation  of  Hölderlin's  philosophy is  found in  his  short  essay  “Über  Urtheil  und
Seyn.” Since this text must be seen as a response to Fichte we will begin with a short
summary of the relevant sections of the Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre. As
we  will  see,  Hölderlin  argues  that  absolute  Being  cannot  be  attributed  to  either
objectivity or subjectivity alone, since both stand in a reciprocal relation to each other.
Being must therefore be conceived as a foundation transcendent to both. It is from this
central thesis that Hölderlin develops many of the other elements of his philosophy, for
example our inability to know Being itself, the notion of infinite approximation, and the
role of the aesthetic. We will at this point turn towards some of Hölderlin's other works
to see how these ideas develop out of this foundational text. Having given an account of
what I take to be the main elements of Hölderlin's philosophy I will then turn to two
major interpretations of Hölderlin as far as idealism and realism are concerned, namely
Beiser and Frank respectively. Beginning with Frank's realist interpretation of Hölderlin
I will argue that his characterisations of idealism and realism prejudge the issue against
the early romantic aim of finding a middle point between idealism and realism and
should therefore be rejected. I will then argue that rather than being able to ascribe a
realism or  idealism to  Hölderlin,  we  find  that  insofar  as  he  takes  subjectivity  and
objectivity to be equally primitive he exemplifies exactly the kind of position we would
expect  from  someone  attempting  to  combine  the  two.  I  will  then  turn  to  Beiser's
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absolute idealist interpretation and argue that, due to Hölderlin's scepticism regarding
absolute knowledge, we can not assimilate Hölderlin, or any of the early romantics, into
the canon of absolute idealism. Having rejected both idealist  and realist  readings of
Hölderlin, along with absolute idealist interpretations, and given an interpretation proper
to Hölderlin's own aims, I will conclude that we both can and should interpret Hölderlin
as finding a middle path between idealism and realism.
Hölderlin on Philosophy
Hölderlin's explicit claims to be finding a middle ground between idealism and
realism are not as plentiful as they are in Novalis and Schlegel. There are however some
places in his texts in which he makes this apparent. In a letter to Niethammer, dated
February 24, 1796, Hölderlin writes of his aim to find “the principle … which is also
capable of making the conflict disappear, the conflict between the subject and object”
(EL:68)3.  To Sinclair Hölderlin makes explicit  his conviction that “everything made,
every product, is the result of the subjective and the objective” (EL:117). To Schiller he
writes that “the unremitting demand that must be made of any system” is the “union of
subject and object in an absolute” (EL:62).  Furthermore,  his rejection of Fichte and
Schelling's  identification  of  the  absolute  with  the  I,  in  the  Grundlage and  Vom Ich
respectively,4 tells  of  a  dissatisfaction  with  attempts  to  overcome  the  subject-object
opposition from within idealism, which is overcome, as we will see, by the positing of
an  absolute  that  is  neither  subjective  nor  objective,  neither  idealistic  nor  realistic.
Finally, in his June 18, 1799 letter to Steinkopf, the Stuttgart bookseller who agreed to
publish Hölderlin's journal, Hölderlin writes of the project he intends to carry out in his
3 Note on referencing throughout the thesis. Where possible references will be made to the relevant 
critical editions. If these are unavailable due to a lack of margin pagination in the translations used 
then I will instead cite the specific fragment numbers. If these are also unavailable the page numbers 
for the translation itself will be used. A key to the in-text citations is available in the bibliography.
4 I focus Hölderlin's critique of Fichte. For a discussion of his rejection of Schelling's Vom Ich, see 
chapter five of (Frank, 2004).
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journal that
“the union and reconciliation of theory with life,  of  art  and taste  with
genius, of the heart with the understanding,  of the real with the ideal, of
the cultural (in the broadest sense of the word) with nature – this will be
the most general character, the spirit, of the journal” (Own emphasis)
(EL:142)
It  becomes clear then,  that Hölderlin's philosophy was concerned with finding some
way of combining idealism and realism.
Let us turn to how Hölderlin attempts to accomplish this aim. In his short essay
titled  “Über  Urtheil  und  Seyn”  Hölderlin  lays  the  foundation  for  his  philosophical
works. Since the text must be understood as a response to, and critique of, Fichte, we
will begin with a short summary of the relevant section from Fichte's  Grundlage der
gesamten Wissenschaftslehre.  Fichte  begins  this  text with  the  search  for  a  principle
expressing  the  act  that  “lies  at  the  basis  of  all  consciousness  and  alone  makes  it
possible” (I, 91). Before finding this however, Fichte begins with what he deems to be a
universally accepted truth,  the truth of the proposition 'A is A' (A = A) (I,  93).  For
Fichte,  this  proposition  does  not  posit  the  existence  of  A,  but  rather  the  necessary
connection between A in the subject position and A in the predicate position such that if
A is posited then it is necessarily true that it is A (I, 93). Fichte marks this necessary
connection 'X.' For Fichte, this X must be found in the self that judges the proposition to
be true according to law. That is, its necessity comes from the self-sufficiency of reason
as the source of its own laws, (one of) the basic presupposition(s) of transcendental
philosophy. Fichte continues, since this X is found in the self and it bears a relation to
each A as that which makes the latter necessarily follow the former by the assertion of
the former, A must also be in the self (I, 94). In other words, the affirmation of A implies
the absolute positing of A for the self. However, the absolute positing of an entity based
on its affirmation is exactly what happens in self-consciousness. In self-consciousness
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the I, in positing itself, makes itself a reality (absolutely posits itself) on the basis of the
law of which it has already been found to be the source (X). This law is neither prior to
nor the result of the I. Instead the I's self-positing and this law are the same. 'I am I' = X
(I,  94).  X,  as  establishing  the  necessary  connection  between  the  absolutely  valid
judgement  'A = A,'  is  itself  as  valid  as  'A = A,'  and therefore  'I  am I,'  the activity
whereby  the  I  posits  itself,  must  also  be  absolutely  valid  (I,  95).  Moreover,  this
principle,  'I  am I,'  or  simply 'I  am,'  expresses  the act  that  lies  at  the  ground of  all
consciousness (I,  96). This principle is both the essence and cause of the self,  or as
Fichte puts  it,  the  self  “posits  itself  by merely existing  and  exists by merely being
posited” (I, 97). Fichte now reverses the previous relation. The absolute validity of the 'I
am I' was originally derived from the absolute validity of 'A = A,' but now it is the
absolute  validity  of  the  self  in  positing  itself  which  grounds  the  validity  of  the
absolutely valid judgement 'A = A' (I, 98). Not only that, but 'A = A' now expresses the
basic condition of existence, now defined by Fichte as an “inference from being posited
to being” (I, 99). Finally, insofar as the I is absolutely posited, and with it the necessity
of the basic proposition of logic (X), and with X the relation of all possible positing (A)
to the self, Fichte concludes that “everything that exists does so only insofar as it is
posited in the self,  and apart from the self there is nothing” (I,  99). In other words,
Fichte identifies the absolute, or Being, with the absolute ego.
In  his  foundational  text  “Über  Urtheil  und  Seyn”  Hölderlin  rejects  this
identification of the absolute ego with Being. This rejection is made on the basis of an
exposition  of  a  further  necessary  condition  for  the  possibility  of  knowledge,  of
judgements, and ultimately, of consciousness.  Hölderlin subscribed to what was at the
time  a  popular  (although  erroneous)  etymological  account  of  the  German  word for
judgement (Urtheil). According to this account  Urtheil is a composition of the prefix
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ur-, meaning original or primal, and the verb  teilen, meaning division. For Hölderlin,
insofar as the most basic division is that between subject and object, the concept of
judgement  therefore  expresses  a  division  which  originally  makes  possible  the
opposition between subject  and object  (US:516).  In addition,  insofar  as subject  and
object are the opposed terms of an original division they also necessarily pre-suppose a
whole which is prior to their creation out of this division and of which they must be
considered parts (US:516). For Hölderlin the opposition between subject and object is
an absolute one.  The subject is  what the object is  not,  while the object is  what the
subject  is  not.  However,  since  these  are  absolutely  opposed,  but  also  related,  as
stipulated both by the copula in the judgement and the fact that opposition is still a form
of relation, there is also a necessary presupposition of a third term through which this
opposition-relation can be made possible. 
So far so good, as for Fichte the absolute ego is that third term of which the ego
and the non-ego must be considered parts and out of which they compose the original
opposition between subject and object. However, this Being cannot for Hölderlin be the
identity that Fichte finds in self-consciousness. As we saw, Fichte's argument for the
absolute  reality of  the  I  stems  from the  absolute  validity of  the  judgement  of  self-
consciousness ('I  am I') which it originally derives from the absolute validity of the
proposition 'A = A' based on the identification of self-consciousness with the (absolutely
valid) necessity of the proposition. As Hölderlin points out however, it is not that the
nature of self-consciousness is such that it expresses an absolute identity between the
subject  (reflective consciousness) and the object  (reflected consciousness) (US:516).
Instead it is essential to the very structure of self-consciousness that there is a division
between consciousness insofar as it reflects upon itself and consciousness insofar as it is
reflected upon, as in self-consciousness I oppose myself to myself in order to recognize
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myself  in  this  opposition  (US:516).  Since  self-consciousness  relies  on  an  essential
division between itself as subject and itself as object self-consciousness (and therefore
the absolute ego) is incapable of providing the unity necessary for the original division
between subject and object, as it is not a unitary reference point through which two
absolutely opposed terms can stand in  a  relation to  each other,  and is  in  fact  itself
dependent on such a pre-supposition. Instead, absolute Being can only be found “where
Subject and Object are absolutely, not just partially united [vereiniget], and hence so
united that no division can be undertaken, without destroying the essence [Wesen] of the
thing  that  is  to  be  sundered  [getrennt],  there  and  not  otherwise  can  we talk  of  an
absolute Being” (US:515-6). Hölderlin therefore rejects Fichte's identification of Being
with the absolute ego and instead takes consciousness to be dependent on a foundation
transcendent to it.
It  is  however  unclear  why Hölderlin  takes  his  argument  to  be  an  argument
against  Fichte's  absolute  ego.  After  all,  the  need  for  a  prior  unity  only arises  with
intentionality (wherein in the opposition between subject and object first comes about).
It is only at the level of the empirical ego that a relation to an object arises (and with it
intentionality), and the absolute ego therefore does not have the intentional character
that  would  presuppose  such  a  prior  unity.  In  addition,  the  judgement  of  self-
consciousness,  which  Hölderlin  has  shown  to  rely  on  an  opposition  instead  of  an
identity, is not one that the absolute ego itself makes but is rather the judgement through
which the empirical ego becomes aware of the identity within the absolute ego, and this
identity does does not have the cognitive character of a judgement but is instead an act.
However, Hölderlin has a response to this possible objection which can be found
in his January 26, 1795 letter to Hegel in which he discusses and critiques the nature of
the absolute ego. In this letter, Hölderlin writes, that Fichte's
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“absolute 'I' ... contains all reality; it is everything, and outside of it there
is nothing; hence there is no object for this 'I,' for otherwise not all reality
would  be within  it;  however,  a  consciousness  without  object  cannot  be
thought,  and if  I  myself  am this  object,  then  I  am as  such necessarily
restricted, even if it were only within time, hence not absolute; therefore,
within the absolute 'I,'  no consciousness is conceivable; as absolute 'I' I
have no consciousness, and insofar as I have no consciousness I am (for
myself) nothing, hence is the absolute 'I' (for me) nothing”
(VI, 155)
Hölderlin's  challenge is  simple but  effective,  if  consciousness only arises  for  Fichte
once the absolute ego opposes the non-ego to the empirical ego then by what right can
he call the absolute ego an ego at all? If the absolute ego itself has no characteristics that
could  be  ascribed  to  empirical  consciousness,  which  it  would  presumably not  as  it
would  then  be  limited  and  not  absolute,  then  what  we  have  stumbled  upon  is  not
something which could be described as an ego but rather we have found absolute Being
itself, that non-determinate unity which must be pre-supposed in the basic opposition
between subject and object.
That  Being  is  the  unity  of  subjectivity  and  objectivity  which  must  be
presupposed  by  consciousness  leads  Hölderlin  into  a  scepticism  regarding  the
possibility of knowledge of the absolute. Following Fichte, Hölderlin takes it that the
basis of all knowledge is the subject-object distinction (EL:68). In other words, we can
only have knowledge of those things that can stand as objects for our consciousness.
However  Being,  as  a  condition  of  the  possibility  of  such  knowledge  and  such  an
opposition, can itself never enter into that relation. If it could, another Being on which
the new relation between a subject and its object would have to be pre-supposed and our
object would not then be absolute Being itself. The idea of such knowledge of Being
itself  is  also  incoherent.  We  can  only know Being  as  an  object,  whereas  Being  is
supposed to be exactly that wherein no division between subject and object can occur
without destroying its essence. We can therefore have no knowledge of Being itself.
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The fact that we can have no knowledge of the absolute does not mean we can
entertain any beliefs regarding its non-existence however. Even though we can never
have any knowledge of something unconditioned or infinite, we can still have negative
knowledge of its reality. The grounds for this knowledge is laid out in an earlier essay of
Hölderlin's titled “On the Concept of Punishment,” as well as a letter written to his half-
brother Karl Gok on the 13th of April 1795. In the essay Hölderlin attempts to describe
how the infinite moral law can appear to consciousness, and how to avoid ending up in
a circular definition of a good will. It is the former which interests us most at present.
Hölderlin's solution to this problem is that we can have a negative awareness of the
infinitude of the moral law insofar as it appears precisely in those instances in which it
is  transgressed (IV, 215).  In acting against  our moral  imperative,  taken from Kant's
categorical imperative, that “a human being should always act in such a way that the
conviction that forms the basis of his action could be a valid law for everyone,” we
transgress  the  moral  law and feel  its  resistance (EL:49).  But  how do we transgress
Being  itself  in  order  to  feel  its  resistance  and  so  gain  negative  knowledge  of  its
existence?  By  transgressing  its  most  essential  feature,  its  unity.  Precisely  because
elements are able to contradict each other they point to a greater unity out of which they
can count as non-compatible determinations of one and the same thing. We can thereby
know  that  Being  itself  must  exist  based  on  our  ability  to  find  things  which  are
antithetical. Moreover, the first and original opposition that would give us such negative
knowledge is the very opposition on which our consciousness depends, that between
subject and object, such that we have negative knowledge of the existence of absolute
Being purely by our experience of the world.
Although negative knowledge of Being is possible, the fact that we can have no
theoretical knowledge of Being means we can never hope to furnish a complete system
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of  knowledge.  First  of  all,  our  knowledge  can  never  transcend  the  subject-object
opposition on which it depends. Since Being is exactly that wherein the elements of
such an opposition are absolutely united knowledge of it would depend on being able to
know it not as an object, but as a unity of subject and object. Since our knowledge
depends on that very opposition we are unable to do this.  Being itself can therefore
never  become one  element  among  every other  in  our  system of  knowledge,  which
would be required for its completeness. Secondly, the unity that Being affords to the
system of its products and the coherence that holds internal to those products as well as
between those products and Being itself is a unity which, although it represents the ideal
of knowledge, we can never hope to achieve. Since it would be knowledge of something
unbounded and undetermined such knowledge would have to be an unconditioned form
of knowledge. However,  we only ever have access to knowledge determined by the
subject-object opposition, which is, as such, a form of conditioned knowledge, meaning
that along with the impossibility of achieving systematic completeness, we can never
achieve the systematic unity required of absolute knowledge either. 
But Hölderlin does not on the basis of this recede into wholesale scepticism.
Rather,   just  as  we can only ever  hope to  approach moral  perfection in  an infinite
progression, so, does Hölderlin write to Schiller, that “the unremitting demand that must
be made of any system, the union of subject and object in an absolute … is theoretically
possible only through endless approximation, like the approximation of a square to a
circle” (EL:49-50, 62). While we can never achieve philosophy's 'unremitting demand'
of both the union of subject and object (as well as of complete knowledge), that does
not mean that we should give up on any attempt to do so. Rather, as philosophers who
aim to maximise our knowledge we should continue in our aim while also being aware
that the infinite nature of that aim will only result in an unending process. Although
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progress in this task is entirely possible its completion is, theoretically speaking, not. In
each  moment  of  the  process  we  can  overcome  more  contradictions  or  expand  our
knowledge to range over more content, thereby more closely approximating the whole
in  both  completeness  and unity,  although  we will  never  reach  that  ideal.  Hölderlin
thereby establishes the notion of infinite approximation which we will find essential to
the philosophies of all three of the major Frühromantiker.
The  notion  of  infinite  approximation  is  given more  determinate  form in  the
conflict found within what Hölderlin calls the “eccentric path.”  The short account of
self-consciousness given in “Über Urtheil und Seyn” lays the foundation for an internal
conflict within consciousness between two tendencies whose nature is fleshed out in
Hyperion  and the  Thalia fragment.5 As we saw, in self-consciousness we distinguish
ourselves  from  ourselves  insofar  as  reflection  is  dependent  on  the  subject-object
distinction, while also recognising our unity with this distinguished element in spite of
this  distinction.  This  double relation is  the manifestation of  two distinct  tendencies,
namely a striving for unity and a striving for difference, both of which are active within
consciousness and its relation to nature and which lay the foundation for the “eccentric
path” (Larmore, 2006, p.148). This path is marked by an initial striving for difference.
In order to assert our freedom we distinguish ourselves from nature to establish our
independence (Larmore, 2006, p.148). However, such distinctions can never be made
absolutely. The subject always requires an object in order to be a subject at all, and our
striving for independence can never be completed in such a way that it would destroy
the very source of that striving. We are therefore forced to remain rooted in the same
nature  which  our  assertion  of  freedom distinguished  us  from,  which  represents  our
second tendency, the tendency towards unity (Larmore, 2006, p.148). We must therefore
attempt to find some way of  reconciling these opposed tendencies by placing them
5 Since no translation of the fragment is available I will be referencing Charles Larmore's summary.
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within  an  ever  more  encompassing  unity,  within  a  unity of  difference  and identity.
However, insofar as that unity within which oppositions such as that of difference and
identity can both be dissolved and arise as oppositions in the first place (Being itself)
can never be an object of cognition, as that which makes cognition possible in the first
place, the recognition of such a reconciliation will itself be impossible. 
Such a  reconciliation  can  instead  only ever  be  infinitely approximated.  This
infinite  approximation  is  accomplished  through  the  realisation  that  these  opposing
tendencies form the basis for human life. This process of realisation is illustrated in
Hölderlin's novel Hyperion. Throughout this text, which takes the form of a retelling of
a number of  events  in Hyperion's  life  in  a series  of  letters to  his  friend Bellarmin,
Hyperion continually finds that the comfort brought on by a new-found sense of unity is
ultimately  destroyed  until  the  angst  induced  by  separation  is  again  overcome,  ad
infinitum. The novel begins with Hyperion lamenting his loss of childlike innocence and
the  subsequent  attempt  to  return  to  that  unity  with  nature  through  the  characters
Adamas, Alabanda, and Diotima. First, with Adamas' longing for the Greeks Hyperion
attempts to reclaim this unity through nostalgia (Hyp:7-8). However, such delight at
“flinging ourselves into … any other world” could not provide for Hyperion the unity
he desires with his own world, and so Hyperion and Adamas depart (Hyp:10). With
Alabanda Hyperion's enthusiasm is stoked by the prospect of achieving morality in and
for the world (Hyp:21). However, this enthusiasm for the prospect of a moral unity in
the world is destroyed both in Hyperion's encounter with Alabanda's friends who, in the
name of principle, have committed grave misdeeds, and the failure of the Greek revolt
that  Hyperion  joins  (which  should  have  led  to  freedom)  to  reduce  to  anything  but
barbarism  (Hyp:23,  25-6,  96-7).  Finally,  through  Diotima's  unreflective  unity  with
nature Hyperion attempts to reclaim his own unity (Hyp:45). However, even Diotima, as
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a result of Hyperion's enthusiasm for morality, becomes alienated from her unreflective
unity  and  finds  herself  unable  to  return  to  it  (Hyp:122).  At  the  end  of  the  novel,
Hyperion again feels his unity with nature, when it seems he has heard Diotima's voice
after her death. At this stage for Hyperion, it seems that “like lovers' quarrels are the
dissonances of the world. Reconciliation is there, even in the midst of strife, and all
things  that  are parted find one another again.” (Hyp:133).  Of course,  this  is  merely
another stage of his life in which one tendency has become dominant, suggested by the
reversal found in the last line: “so I thought. More soon” (Hyp:133). 
Inevitably, either of the two tendencies that are essential to consciousness will be
dominant and life proceeds in an alternating rhythm between the two. While we could
never  hope  to  reconcile  these  opposed  tendencies  we  can  approximate  this
reconciliation by reconciling ourselves with this  very fact as Hyperion does. By not
striving  against  these  tendencies  we  allow  their  harmony  as  two  contradictory
determinations of one and the same thing, ourselves, to become greater, and thus further
approximate the unity of Being.
A presupposition of the possibility of such approximation highlights a positive
aspect of our knowledge of the absolute which I earlier referred to as merely negative.
This is a presupposition which does not appear in positions that are merely sceptical or
pessimistic concerning knowledge of Being itself. The most appropriate example of this
is Kant's transcendental idealism (at least as far as the theoretical is concerned). For
Kant  knowledge  of  the  constitution  of  things  in  themselves  is  impossible  for  our
discursive intellect  as the forms of our intuition,  space and time, through which the
manifold  of  sensibility is  given to  us  and unified  by the categories,  are  merely the
subjective forms of our sensible intuition (A26/B42, A32-33/B49-50). In this sense we
are, at least as far as the theoretical is concerned, separated from Being (conceived as
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things  in  themselves)  since  the  possibility  of  knowledge  of  things  in  themselves  is
discounted entirely. In Hölderlin however, we must be cognitively 'closer' to Being than
in Kant. For example, for Hölderlin we know Being to be ground of the division of
subject and object which constitutes both our existence and our thought and we also
know  that  it  is  both  absolute  unity  and  absolute.  Most  importantly  however,  for
Hölderlin we must stand in a relation to Being itself that is not merely one of having
something as  one's  ground since  this  relation  to  Being  is  that  which  enables  us  to
approximate it at all. If we did not stand in some relation to that which we approximate
then the notion of approximation as a determinate task would not be intelligible.  In
order for approximation to be possible some knowledge of the goal, that standard by
which  two  separate  moments  of  the  process  of  approximation  can  be  judged  and
understood as accomplishing this approximation to a greater or lesser extent, must be
presupposed. Therefore, for Hölderlin, we are not entirely isolated from Being as Kant
takes it that we are from things in themselves, and our knowledge of Being itself is not
merely negative, but must have a positive aspect which does not entail cognitive or
theoretical knowledge and which grounds the possibility of that approximation. As we
will see, Novalis will later dub this relation 'feeling.'
Although we can theoretically never hope to complete the infinite approximation
that aims at knowledge of Being, this approximation can be accomplished aesthetically.
This occurs particularly metaphorically in tragic poetry.6 This is intimated in Hölderlin's
letter to Schiller quoted above wherein Hölderlin writes that although the union of the
subject and object is “theoretically possible only through endless approximation” it is
still possible aesthetically (EL:62). An account of this possibility is given in Hölderlin's
short essay  On the Difference of Poetic Modes.  First,  however, we must go back to
6 For a more in-depth discussion see Françoise Dastur's “Tragedy and Speculation” and Jean-François 
Courtine's “Of Tragic Metaphor” in (Beistegui & Sparks, 2000)
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“Über Urtheil  und Seyn.” Here we saw that the most basic division of thought and
existence is that between subject and object.7 This division must also not only be a
division of Being but must come from Being itself since at the level of Being itself there
is nothing else which could be the author of this division. Therefore, one of the ways in
which Being reveals itself, and the primary way it reveals itself to us, is as the author of
division  (or  of  judgement).  Intellectual  intuition,  the  non-theoretical  source  of  our
awareness of the original unity, reflects this, as it is based on “the impossibility of an
absolute separation and individuation” (IV, 268). When the parts of which Being is the
source  reach  their  extreme  form  of  part-hood,  of  determinacy,  differentiation,  and
separation, without losing their shared unity, unity appears at its strongest, as at that
very  moment  the  “impossibility  of  an  absolute  separation  and  individuation”  is
demonstrated  by each  element  being  shown to  still  be  “a  state  of  the  primordially
united” (IV, 268). This is re-iterated in Hölderlin's “The Significance of the Tragedies,”
where he writes that “original matter appears not in original strength but, in fact, in its
weakness” (IV, 274). The strength of the unity of Being shows itself not in appearances
of unity but in the parts whose separation and differentiation nears absolute. That unity
still exists at separation's strongest possible point attests to its ultimate power. Since it
appears  at  separation's  strongest  possible  point  it  must  itself  also appear  at  its  own
weakest point. Therefore, “original matter can only appear in its weakness” and the sign
through which we represent the original must be “posited as insignificant = 0” (IV, 274).
This is exactly what occurs in tragedy. In the tragic poem the tragic hero, aware of his
fate, attempts to affirm his freedom against this fate, an attempt which ultimately leads
to the hero committing the act they wished to avoid.  At this point a paradox arises
between freedom and fate, between the hero taking responsibility for something they
7 That the division between subject and object concerns existence and not merely thought is made clear 
in Hölderlin's February 24, 1796 letter to Niethammer.
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perpetrated despite having willed to avoid it. At this point we find that the hero's death,
the  taking  of  responsibility  for  their  actions,  reduces  the  hero  (the  sign)  to
insignificance, and therefore maximally represents the unity of freedom and necessity,
and the unity of Being itself. The tragic is therefore both the metaphor and effector of
intellectual intuition (IV, 266).
Hölderlin and Frank on Realism and Idealism
So what can we say about realism and idealism in Hölderlin? While Manfred
Frank ascribes to Hölderlin a strong form of realism Beiser characterises Hölderlin as an
absolute idealist. First, let us look at Frank and Hölderlin's realism. Going back to the
argument presented in Hölderlin's “Über Urtheil und Seyn” we can see how Hölderlin’s
account of judgement stands in direct opposition to idealism. If the source of absolute
reality is attributed to consciousness then we get an extreme form of idealism but it is
just this that Hölderlin rejects. The question that remains is whether that in turn allows
us to ascribe to Hölderlin an adherence to realism. In respect to that we could take the
view that ascribing reality and independence to anything outside of consciousness by
definition opposes itself to idealism and thus is a form of realism. In this way we would
playing  on  the  historical  opposition  between  idealism  and  realism and  committing
ourselves  to  the  view  that  to  negate  a  position  is  the  same  as  affirming  its  direct
opposite. This is Frank's conviction regarding the  Frühromantiker as a whole. In his
series of lectures,8 Frank gives three definitions of what he takes realism to be. There is
the general position of realism, which Frank takes to be the belief that “that which has
being … cannot be traced back to determinations of our consciousness” (Frank, 2004,
p.28). In addition, this basic conviction can be split up into two major types of realism,
8 Although we will be focusing on the interpretation of the Early German Romantics given in (Frank, 
2004), his writings on the romantics extend beyond this and anyone interested should also look at 
(Frank, 1997) from which these lectures are taken, as well as (Frank, 1989) and (Frank, 1972).
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the  metaphysical  and  epistemological,  which  respectively  take  it  that  reality  exists
independent of consciousness and that we do not possess adequate knowledge of reality
(Frank, 2004, p.28). In applying these definitions to Hölderlin, Frank's basic argument is
this:  “they  [Hölderlin  and  Novalis] claim  that  the  relation  of  self-consciousness
indicates conditioned knowledge, which obtains its Cartesian certainty (literally, then,
its  unconditioned-ness)  only  under  the  presupposition  that  is  not  presentable  in
knowledge. This presupposition is unconditioned Being. This is closely tied to a basic
position of realism, which from its very roots, lies in opposition to absolute idealism”
(Frank,  2004,  p.75).  For  Frank,  and  as  we  saw  above,  Hölderlin  rejects  the  self-
sufficiency of  self-consciousness  on the  basis  that  the  duality found in  the  form of
judgement through which we represent the unity of self-consciousness contradicts the
unity that is actually experienced in self-consciousness such that self-consciousness can
not be the source of this unity but instead unified Being must be pre-supposed as its
condition (Frank, 2004, p.107). Since self-consciousness itself presupposes a prior unity
this  means  that  Being  cannot  be  'traced  back  to  determinations  of  it.'  Additionally,
insofar as consciousness is a result of the original division of this Being this Being must
also exist independently of consciousness. Lastly, insofar as Being precedes the division
into  subject  and  object  upon  which  knowledge  depends  we  can  also  never  have
adequate  knowledge of  it.  Hölderlin  therefore qualifies,  by Frank's  definitions,  as  a
realist.
There are however some problems with Frank's account. The first is general and
concerns a discrepancy in Frank’s definitions of idealism and realism.  Frank defines
idealism as “the conviction - made especially compulsory by Hegel - that consciousness
is a self-sufficient phenomenon, one which is still able to make the presuppositions of
its existence comprehensible by its own means” (Frank, 2004, p.178). According to this
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definition only someone who takes consciousness to not be a product of the world or
things in the world and who simultaneously bears no sceptical beliefs about the limits of
our knowledge will count as an idealist. However, no such absoluteness arises out of
Frank's definitions of realism, in which there is a certain ambiguity or scope for what is
to count as a realist. For example, there is no ambiguity about what it is to be able to
make the presuppositions of the existence of consciousness comprehensible (one either
can or can not), but there is a large ambiguity about what it is to not possess adequate
knowledge of reality. There are after all a wide variety of ways in which non-adequacy
of knowledge might manifest itself. For example, it might be a naïve realism with the
addition of an indeterminacy of certain features of quantum entities, or it might be a
wholesale scepticism about any claims to knowledge (bar the claim that Being is not
reducible  to  determinations  of  consciousness).  There  is  therefore,  as  far  as  these
definitions  are  concerned,  an  absoluteness  or  narrowness  about  what  it  is  to  be  an
idealist and an ambiguity or breadth about what it is to be a realist. In this way Frank
prejudges the issue against the attempt of all the Frühromantiker  to combine idealism
and realism, as it is far too easy, using Frank's own definitions, to identify someone as a
realist and far too difficult to identify them as an idealist.
Moreover,  Frank,  who  takes  the  early  romantics  to  be  calling  for  a  're-
Kantianization'  of  philosophy  ignores  the  possibility  of  the  romantics  employing  a
strategy that can be traced back to Kant's antinomies in which philosophical positions
that can be formulated as logical contradictions can be overcome, which is exactly what
Hölderlin is attempting to accomplish. This is the strategy found in Kant's dynamical
and teleological  antinomies  as well  as in Fichte's  “Deduction of Presentation.” That
Hölderlin was concerned with this method becomes clear from two facts.9 Firstly, in a
letter  to  Hegel  Hölderlin  writes  that  “the  way  in  which  he  [Kant]  combines  the
9 For a more in-depth discussion see (Waibel, 2010).
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mechanism of nature (hence also of destiny) with its purposefulness seems to me to
contain indeed the entire spirit of his system,” adding later that Fichte has a 'remarkable
notion' concerning the antinomies” (VI, 156) . Secondly, in a letter to Sinclair Hölderlin
makes  a  specific  attempt  to  overcome  the  opposition  between  mechanistic  and
teleological explanation that occupied Kant in the Critique of the Power of Judgement,
the solution of which, as we will see, takes a Fichtean form. 
Let us quickly look at the development of the antinomical methods employed by
Kant and Fichte as Waibel outlines them in her excellent article on just this topic. In the
antinomies  in  which  Kant  does  not  merely reject  both  the  thesis  and antithesis  his
solutions  take  two  forms.  Either  the  conflicting  elements  are  found  to  arise  out  of
independent sources such that they can not be mutually exclusive in relation to each
other,  or  the  question  posed  by  their  opposition  is  exposed  as  one  which  neither
understanding nor reason can adequately answer (Waibel, 2010, p.312). The former can
be  seen  in  the  third  antinomy found  in  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason in  which  the
opposition between determinism (or mechanism) and agency is overcome by limiting
mechanical  explanations  to  empirical  phenomena  while  extra-mechanical  forms  of
causation, that is, freedom, are ascribed to the intelligible 'realm' (Waibel, 2010, p.309).
The latter solution can be seen in the teleological antinomy found in the Critique of the
Power  of  Judgement.  This  antinomy  concerns  the  cognitive  validity  of  purely
mechanical  and  teleological  explanations. To  solve  this  antinomy  Kant  gives
teleological  judgements  a  merely  regulative  validity.  While  mechanical  laws  are
constitutively valid for all objects of nature, some natural objects can not be adequately
explained in  accordance  with merely mechanical  laws,  thereby requiring  the use of
teleological explanations which can only be regulative insofar as we are incapable of
determining the idea to which the teleological process conforms (Waibel, 2010, p.305-
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6).  In  addition,  due  to  the  limits  of  our  human  cognition,  we  are  incapable  of
discovering the 'common root' of these forms of causality (Waibel, 2010, p.306).
In Fichte's  Grundlage the problem of Kant's third antinomy is repeated but the
solution is changed. The Grundlage centres around the two propositions, corresponding
to  the  theoretical  and  practical  respectively.  These  are,  “the  self  posits  itself  as
determined by the not-self” and “the self posits the not-self as limited by the self” (I,
125-6). In other words, the self can be seen as both determined by its objects or free to
determine those same objects. The solution is given in a passage that refers explicitly to
Kant's antinomies, in which Fichte writes that “self and not-self are reciprocally related;
if  one is  finite,  the other  is  infinite,  and  vice versa  … (here lies the ground of the
antinomies expounded by Kant)” (I, 245-6). Fichte's solution then, is not a limitation of
the scope of the antinomy's underlying notions but  rather  an account  of the way in
which the two principles interact and relate to each other (Waibel, 2010, p.312). This
differs from Kant's solution as not only can reason adequately answer for the opposition
itself insofar as it is shown to be a reciprocal determination, but this antinomy does not
even arise out of the independent sources of each element, since both are grounded in
(and their  interaction  mediated by)  the  activity of  the imagination.  For  Fichte,  it  is
through the imagination that the self's infinite activity reaches outwards, meets its check
and becomes finite, and continues to oscillate between these two states.10
Back to Hölderlin.  Waibel,  in lieu  of a discussion of Hölderlin's approach to
teleology and mechanism, due to a lack of any in-depth discussion of this on Hölderlin's
part,  opts  to  connect  Hölderlin's thought  with  Kant's  in  the  antinomies  through  his
discussion of punishment. However, we get a much stronger connection if we consider
Hölderlin's letter to Sinclair dated 24 December 1798. In this letter Hölderlin attempts
to overcome the opposition between teleology and mechanism. He begins by rejecting
10 Thus, “all reality … is brought forth solely by the imagination” (I, 227).
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mechanism, on the grounds that it would have no object. Hölderlin argues that 'absolute
monarchy' or complete determination is a self-defeating notion since anything which is
completely able to determine its object will no longer have such an object opposed to
itself  (EL:117).   Insofar as a universalised mechanism would represent just  such an
'absolute monarchy'  we should reject it  as internally incoherent.  Instead teleology is
found to be necessary for mechanism to be true, as any object must be a result of “the
individual and the whole … and that together they make up one living whole which …
consists of parts which are entirely independent  but at the same time intimately and
indissolubly interconnected” (LS:117-8). This form of explanation does not remove the
need for mechanistic explanation since one can still consider, from limited perspectives,
certain  forces  to  be  dominant  and  to  cause  their  effect  according  to  the  laws  of
mechanics (LS:118). Clearly then, Hölderlin was preoccupied not only with the issues
of combining mechanism and purposefulness which seemed to him to contain the entire
spirit of Kant's system but also with Fichte's 'remarkable notion,' namely his solution to
the antinomy of freedom and mechanism that does not invoke some form of dualism. 
Interestingly, we can also see Hölderlin's sublation of subjectivity and objectivity
in absolute Being as following the structure of the resolution of an antinomy. First of all,
we  have  the  basic  constituents  of  reality,  subjectivity  and  objectivity,  and  their
corresponding metaphysical thesis and antithesis, sketched as “we can only adequately
explain the world according to subjectivity” or “we can only adequately explain the
world according to objectivity.” Hölderlin can then be seen to be offering a Fichtean
solution  to  this  antinomy  since  he  shows  the  necessary  interaction  of  the  notions
underlying the thesis and antithesis as well as attributing them to a common source.
First of all, insofar as subject and object must, by their opposition, be related through
some third term, we are entitled to consider the existence of that term through which
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this relation can be made possible, namely Being. We thereby establish their common
source.  Furthermore,  insofar  as  absolute  Being,  qua  absolute,  has  no  determinate
existence, the world does not arise at the level of Being itself. Instead, the world arises
only out of the opposition of subjectivity and objectivity which itself is a result of the
original  division  of  Being,  and  it  is  only  through  the  reciprocal  determination  of
subjectivity and objectivity that the world itself arises. We therefore have some basic
knowledge of  the relation in  which subjectivity and objectivity stand to  each other.
Hölderlin's  notion  of  Being  thereby  overcomes  the  antinomy  of  metaphysical
explanation:  the  world  can  only  be  adequately  understood  in  the  interaction  of
subjectivity and objectivity.
Frank's characterisation can not be right then. First of all, while it would be a
stretch to say that Hölderlin in actuality is employing the very same method that Fichte
develops from Kant, it is clear that firstly, we should interpret Hölderlin as attempting to
combine  idealism  and  realism,  based  on  his  own  claims,  and  secondly,  that  the
conceptual tools that would enable such a task, as well as a belief in our intellectual
ability to combine contradictory positions, is present in the very philosopher that Frank
sees Hölderlin, and the other romantics, as in some way returning to. Second of all,
Frank's argument trades on a symmetry of opposition between idealism and realism that
is  not  shared  with  the  term  that  Hölderlin  introduces  in  his  rejection  of  the  self-
sufficiency of subjectivity. Specifically, the opposition between idealism and realism,
through which the negation of idealism would lead to realism, is not symmetrical to the
opposition  between  subjectivity  and  Being  in  Hölderlin.  The  term  that  would  be
symmetrically antithetical to subjectivity is objectivity. If Hölderlin rejected the self-
sufficient status of consciousness in favour of grounding it in objectivity then Hölderlin
could be interpreted as a realist. Of course this can not be the case for Hölderlin since
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the  move  away  from the  subjective,  with  regards  to  ultimate  reality,  does  not  for
Hölderlin bring us into the objective, that is, into realism. Instead, we find that Being, in
Hölderlin's sense, is exactly that which can neither be traced back to determinations of
consciousness or to whatever is opposed to consciousness. In other words, the ground of
reality is found in Being that is prior to and which perfectly unites the opposed terms
whose  focus  within  a  philosophical  position  would  allow us  to  ascribe  to  it  either
idealism or realism. Now Frank does not think that Hölderlin is  attributing ultimate
reality to objectivity. However, this is what would have to be the case if his negation of
consciousness  is  to  necessarily  lead  to  realism.  Frank therefore  prejudges  the  issue
against Hölderlin insofar as his definitions make it far too easy to identify someone as a
realist, he does not see the possibility of Hölderlin employing a similar framework as
we find in Kant, and finally, he relies on an asymmetrical opposition between idealism
and realism as well as consciousness and Being.
Frank  could  seemingly  reply  that  such  asymmetries  do  not  matter  since
Hölderlin undoubtedly takes reality to be transcendent to consciousness. However, once
we have a proper account of what reality is for Hölderlin we see that Hölderlin's notion
of reality is not in fact entirely transcendent to consciousness, and that, in this way his
position embodies exactly what we would expect from someone attempting to combine
idealism and realism. So why is Frank wrong to claim that Hölderlin posits a reality
transcendent to consciousness? Because the only 'thing' transcendent to consciousness is
Being, which is not a candidate for reality. This is because Being, as absolute, is that
ground which exists before any determination, or opposition, whatsoever, and therefore
can not be determinate or differentiated. It is only with the introduction of difference
and distinction that reality first arises out of the undetermined, or pure, existence of
Being. And, as we know, the first division and opposition that result from this Being is
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subjectivity and objectivity. In this sense, the world is as much dependent on mind as it
is on objectivity, or in other words, reality is for Hölderlin not entirely transcendent to
consciousness as Frank claims, as it is partially dependent on it. Frank must be wrong
therefore to characterise Hölderlin as a realist since the Being that Hölderlin presents as
an alternative ultimate ground in place of consciousness is not determinate enough to
say whether it entails that Hölderlin's philosophy is grounded in realism or idealism. In
addition,  once we do get  to the level of explanation in  which such an ascription is
possible, that is, the level of reality, we find that, insofar as the terms which now appear,
namely subjectivity and objectivity, are equiprimordial, since neither can be discounted
or favoured over the other,  we find that,  rather than providing us with a realism or
idealism, which grounds one element in the other or discounts it entirely, Hölderlin's
philosophy exemplifies exactly what we would expect from a position which attempts
to overcome the opposition between realism and idealism.
Hölderlin and Beiser on Absolute Idealism
However,  another  form of  idealism still  remains.  This  is  the  idealism which
Beiser  ascribes  to  Hölderlin  which  is  less  concerned  with  whether  or  not  being  is
grounded in consciousness and more concerned with the notion of a rational organising
principle or idea. Beiser interprets Hölderlin, along with the other Frühromantiker, as an
absolute  idealist.  First  of  all,  for  Beiser,  absolute  idealism  is  characterised  by  a
commitment to the existence of the absolute, that which is understood  through itself
and exists in-itself and only for-itself (equivalent to Spinoza's substance) (Beiser, 2008,
p.351-2).The absolute idealists are, for Beiser, also united in a reaction against and part
rejection of Fichte coupled with a sympathy for Spinoza and monism (Beiser, 2003,
p.133).  This  rejection  of  Fichte  takes  its  form as  a  stronger  realism.  The  absolute
idealists are more realist than Fichte insofar as they take it that Being cannot be reduced
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to subjectivity since the absolute contains all being (including material physics objects)
(Beiser, 2008, p.356). Furthermore, absolute idealists are also Platonists insofar as they
accept the theory of forms. Absolute idealism is also, for Beiser, characterised by its
vitalism, the identification of the universe with an organism in a constant process of
development according to some determinate purpose or idea (hence it is also a form of
rationalism)  (Beiser,  2008,  p.352).  Alongside  this  vitalism we find  an  adherence  to
naturalism. Insofar as as the absolute idealists are monists they must therefore also hold
that everything is a part of the absolute and must therefore be explicable according to its
laws (Beiser, 2008, p.355). Furthermore, according to Beiser, absolute idealists see the
mental and material as “different degrees of organization and development of a single
living force” rather than distinct substances (Beiser, 2008, p.367). In the sense that the
absolute  idealists  identify  the  absolute  with  a  force  in  constant  development  in
accordance with some ideal, and the mental and the physical are both appearances of
this single living force, absolute idealism must be a form of idealism (Beiser, 2008,
p.353). With this in mind Beiser offers a short definition of absolute idealism: “absolute
idealism is the doctrine that everything is a part of the single universal organism, or that
everything conforms to, or is an appearance of, its purpose, design, or idea” (Beiser,
2008. p.352). Lastly, Beiser's interpretation is adamantly anti-sceptical. Beiser rejects
any sceptical reading of the absolute idealists on the basis that it is the result of focusing
solely on earlier manuscripts. The shift Beiser claims to have found is marked by a later
adherence to  the Platonic heritage whose roots he claims are obvious in  the earlier
manuscripts  as  well.  This adherence is  based on the absolute  idealists'  emphasis on
intellectual intuition and its non-discursivity which Beiser takes to be directly inspired
by the non-discursive intuition of Plato's forms (Beiser, 2003, p.60).
Beiser takes Hölderlin to instantiate this form of idealism insofar as he argues in
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favour of four specific theses. First, denying that subject-object identity can be located
within consciousness alone.  Second, that the absolute is constitutive and not merely
regulative. Third, the claim that cognition of such an absolute is possible. And lastly,
that nature is an autonomous organism with an independently existing reality (Beiser,
2008, p.375). 
We have already seen the first  of  these theses.  Fichte's  I  cannot  contain the
identity of subjectivity and objectivity since self-consciousness depends on a division
between these terms that disqualify it as a source of this identity, which must now be
found in Being (Beiser, 2008, p.389). 
The second of these theses follow from the first. Beiser sees in this argument a
transcendental deduction of Spinoza's substance. Following Fichte, Hölderlin takes the
basic condition of knowledge to be subject-object identity. But insofar as this can only
be found in a ground transcendent to consciousness akin to Spinoza's substance then the
thought of this ground must be constitutive rather than regulative (Beiser, 2008, p.391). 
The third thesis comes as a result of Hölderlin's aesthetics. Although for Beiser it
is clear that Hölderlin thought we could gain knowledge of being itself through aesthetic
means he takes him to have never completed his strategy for justifying this conclusion.
What Beiser takes Hölderlin to have wanted to argue for is the necessity of aesthetic
ideas for ensuring the proper functioning of understanding and reason (Beiser, 2008,
p.396).  Both reason and understanding are analytic,  proceeding from the part  to the
whole, but they both presuppose some synthetic faculty, or sense for the whole through
which their results can be ordered, which can only be found in aesthetic sense (Beiser,
2008, p.396). If understanding and Reason can not presuppose this whole they fall into
contradiction  and  would  thereby  vindicate  scepticism  which  Hölderlin,  on  Beiser's
reading, would want to avoid, at least in its entirety (Beiser, 2008, p.396). In addition,
33
Beiser takes it that for Hölderlin cognition of the absolute is possible since even though
Being is transcendent to consciousness and is the condition of experience and thinking,
it is only the condition of discursive thinking and sensible intuition, and it can still make
its appearance in intellectual intuition or aesthetic experience (Beiser, 2008, p.393). 
The last thesis, concerning Hölderlin's organicism and the autonomy of nature,
arises out of an opposition between different features the absolute must exhibit. First of
all, being itself must be absolute unity. However, insofar as the world is to arise out of it
it must also be 'self-distinguishing' (Beiser, 2008, p.398). In other words, the forms and
activity whereby the absolute differentiates itself must have their source in the absolute
itself. Insofar as this is the case the absolute can be identified with an organism in a
constant  process  of  “growth,  organization,  or  differentiation,”  and  in  “development
from  the  uniﬁed,  inchoate,  and  indeterminate  into  the  manifold,  organized,  and
determinate”  (Beiser,  2008,  p.399).  Within  this  framework  the  ideal  and  real  are
different degrees of development of a single living force, which at the same time only
become what they are through the other (Beiser, 2008, p.400). The aesthetic dimension
returns  here as Beiser takes it  that  for Hölderlin beauty is  “is  nothing less than the
harmonic structure of reality itself” (Beiser, 2008, p.379). 
We  have  already  seen  how  Hölderlin's  position  can  be  seen  to  be  neither
idealistic nor realistic, and Beiser agrees with this at the level of idealism and realism in
general (Beiser, 2008, p.389). However, for Beiser, Hölderlin can still be considered an
absolute idealist since Beiser takes the question of absolute idealism to be separate from
that of idealism and realism.  Insofar as absolute idealism is a position which sublates
the differences between idealism and realism then it can still be consistent to claim that
Hölderlin  is  both an absolute  idealist  and that  he wishes to  overcome idealism and
realism. 
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The  problem  with  Beiser's  interpretation  therefore  can  not  be  that  of  the
characterisation of Hölderlin as an absolute idealist in the face of Hölderlin's own aims
but  is  instead  found  in  the  characterisation  itself.  Specifically,  the  problem is  that
Hölderlin simply can not be characterised as an absolute idealist. This is because the
Frühromantiker,  including  Hölderlin, set  themselves  apart  from the  development  of
absolute idealism precisely in their scepticism about the possibility of knowledge of the
absolute. Granted, the Frühromantiker held strong convictions regarding the existence
of some identity between the subject and object which can be characterised as Being, a
presupposition shared by the absolute idealists.11 However,  this  conviction,  though a
strong metaphysical thesis in its own right, also comes with a series of epistemological
constraints which do not appear in their absolute idealist counterparts. Schelling, for
example, in his identity philosophy, begins with this identity as opposed to deducing it.
For the romantics on the other hand, Being's existence, and that it meets the demand
from which its existence is derived (that it is an identity between subject and object), are
the  only  things  we  can  know  regarding  this  absolute,  which  otherwise  remains
ungraspable in its entirety. This sets them apart from absolute idealism for which the
absolute remains graspable and knowable. That the absolute can, for Hölderlin and the
other early romantics, be felt or intimated in aesthetic intuition is not enough to warrant
their  inclusion  in  this  movement  precisely  because  its  central  tenet  regarding  the
possibility  of  theoretical  knowledge  of  the  absolute  is  categorically  rejected  by the
romantics. Beiser is therefore, I suggest, wrong to characterise Hölderlin as an absolute
idealist.
In  conclusion,  we  can  not  interpret  Hölderlin  as  a  realist,  idealist,  or  even
absolute idealist,  but should instead interpret  him as finding a middle path between
11 See §41 in Hegel’s Logic: Part One of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, and §1 of 
Schelling's Darstellung
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idealism and realism as I have done above. We began with a short summary making
clear that this was in fact Hölderlin's aim before moving on to the major elements of
Hölderlin's philosophy based on the metaphysical and epistemological foundations laid
out in his essay “Über Urtheil und Seyn.” As we saw, Hölderlin's position is one of
scepticism regarding the possibility of theoretical knowledge of the absolute outside of
aesthetic representation coupled with a rejection of Fichte's absolute I as a candidate for
that absolute. Being is instead identified as that which consciousness itself presupposes
and which gives unity to the subject-object opposition. Knowledge of this Being can
also  only ever  be  infinitely approximated.  We then turned to  Frank's  interpretation,
which argues that insofar as Hölderlin takes reality to be transcendent to consciousness
and our knowledge to be inadequate to reality Hölderlin should be seen as a realist.
However,  we dismissed such an  interpretation  on the grounds that  it  not  only goes
against  Hölderlin's  own aims but  misrepresents  his  notion  of  Being and of  reality's
dependence  on  and  independence  from  consciousness.  We  then  found  that  since
subjectivity and objectivity only arise out of opposition to each other, are dependent on
each  other,  are  equiprimordial,  and  that  the  world  is  a  product  of  this  opposition,
Hölderlin's philosophy exemplifies exactly the position we would expect from someone
who  wanted  to  combine  idealism  and  realism.  Having  covered  the  possibility  of
interpreting Hölderlin in line with his own aims, and rejected one-sided idealist  and
realist readings of Hölderlin, we turned to a last alternative, namely Beiser's absolute
idealist reading. Here we saw that we simply can not include Hölderlin, or any of the
Frühromantiker,  in  the  absolute  idealist  movement  since  their  scepticism regarding
absolute knowledge, regardless of any aesthetic manifestations of such knowledge, sets
them apart from the basic position of absolute idealism. Having rejected any idealist,
realist, or absolute idealist readings of Hölderlin, and demonstrated the possibility of
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interpreting Hölderlin in accordance with his own aims, I conclude that we both can and
should interpret Hölderlin as finding a middle path between idealism and realism.
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Chapter 2 – Realism and Idealism in Novalis
In this chapter I will be looking at realism and idealism in Novalis. I will show
that we both can and should interpret Novalis as falling somewhere between idealism
and realism. I will begin by making it clear that this was in fact Novalis' aim by giving
some examples from his own texts in which he makes this explicit. I will then move on
to  his  arguments  regarding the  nature  of  philosophy and the  possibility of  absolute
knowledge as found in his Fichte Studies. As we will see, the Fichte Studies is a divided
text. The dialectical product of a struggle between Novalis' philosophical ambitions and
his self-imposed epistemological constraints. In order to bring this out I will begin with
a summary of what Novalis takes to be the aim of philosophy followed by his criticism
of Fichte that makes apparent why he takes it that Fichte was unsuccessful in achieving
these aims. We will see more of this internal struggle as we look closer at Novalis' aims
and sceptical conclusions about the nature of reflection. I will then move on to the later
writings of Novalis, his fragments and  Das Allgemeine Brouillon.  There is a tension
between these and the earlier work insofar as these works are not sceptical to the degree
that the Fichte Studies were. However, as I will show, scepticism is as much part of the
later work as it is of the earlier work in Novalis, something which recent accounts such
as Frederick Beiser and Alison Stone's have not taken sufficiently into account. Having
presented  Novalis'  philosophical  position  I  will  then  quickly  summarise  Beiser  and
Frank's  opposing  interpretations  of  Novalis  as  an  absolute  idealist  and  realist
respectively, before giving a critique of these one-sided interpretations. In the light of
this  and what has preceded I will  then give an interpretation of Novalis'  relation to
idealism and realism which  takes  his  self-proclaimed aim of  finding a  middle  path
between the two into account. Having done this, I will conclude that we both can and
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should interpret Novalis' philosophical position as occupying a space between idealism
and realism.
Novalis on Philosophy
Novalis makes it clear in several places that one of his philosophical aims is to
find some middle position between idealism and realism. For example, in a selection of
notes  titled  General  Draft intended  for  his  encyclopedia  Novalis  writes  that  the
“idealization  of  realism  and  realization  of  idealism  leads  to  truth”  (GD:32).
Additionally,  in  Das  Allgemeine  Brouillon  Novalis  makes  clear  his  contention  that
idealism and realism are not opposed, or at least that this opposition can be removed
insofar as “idealism should not be opposed to realism, but to formalism” (AB:565).
However, it is not just that this opposition is in some way illusory or surmountable, but
it is essential to the very task of philosophy as it is only “the complete concurrence of
idealism and realism” that “furnishes the complete proof of the correct methodology for
everything” (AB:634).
In order to find out how Novalis' takes himself to accomplish this aim we will
begin by looking at his collection of notes and fragments, written in 1795 and 1796,
titled  Fichte Studies. This collection of notes is a divided work. The work contains a
sustained critique of Fichte and of the possibility of philosophy in general while also
containing  several  fragments  that  reveal  Novalis'  philosophical  aims  which  stand
opposed to the conclusions reached in the sections manifesting the former of these two
tendencies. Insofar as the possibility of philosophy in general, or rather, the possibility
of  a  sufficient  and total  system of  philosophy is  concerned,  Novalis  presents  three
arguments against this possibility which are all based on an exposition of the nature of
reflection. The first of these is found in Novalis' critique of Fichte and here Novalis
argues that reflection is incapable of grasping identity in itself insofar as it must always
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present identity as a compound rather than a simple identity. If reflection is only capable
of grasping identity is a compound, or as secondary, then it must also be incapable of
grasping the absolute as that which is prior to its products. Secondly, Novalis argues that
reflection necessarily reverses the order of being in the objects it reflects upon. Finally,
Novalis reiterates in his own terms an argument common amongst his contemporaries,
that insofar as our knowledge is always conditioned we are incapable of grasping the
unconditioned (or the absolute).
Some way into the  Fichte Studies Novalis writes about the start and aims of
philosophy.  “What  do  I  do  when  I  philosophize?”  Asks  Novalis,  “I  reﬂect  upon  a
ground. The ground of philosophizing is thus a striving after the thought of a ground”
(FS:566). The ground is that which ensures something's connection to the whole. If two
things share a ground their connection can be made apparent. The end of philosophy is
for Novalis an absolute ground, that which would provide unity to the entire series of
conditioneds  that  compose  our  world  (FS:566).  Philosophy  therefore  starts  with  a
systematic disposition. We search for the unconditioned which would allow us to order
and connect every thing into a systematic whole and whose own existence must also be
made apparent and explicit. This ground itself is being, the pre-subjective and unitary
ground of consciousness and nature. “Being,” is the “ground of all relation” (FS:312).
This  starting  point  of  philosophy  also  contains  its  high-reaching  ambitions  that
combined with Novalis' continual scepticism set the stage of the internal dialectic of the
work. With this search for Being Novalis is aiming at transcending Spinoza and Fichte,
where “Spinoza ascended as far as nature – Fichte to the I, or the person. I [ascend] to
the thesis God” (FS:151).
However, due to the nature of reflection, this search for the absolute ground, for
Being,  and  for  God,  will  never  be  completed.  Novalis'  first  argument  against  the
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possibility of this appears in his critique of Fichte's I as a principle of philosophy. For
Fichte the ground with which Novalis takes our philosophising to be tasked with finding
is  found  in  the  self-constituting  act  of  consciousness  in  which  there  is  an  identity
between the self insofar as it is an object for a subject and the self insofar as it has an
object for itself, is a subject. As we saw in the last chapter, Fichte took the identity of
self-consciousness to be absolutely valid and the existence of the I to be absolute insofar
as he took it to be a necessary condition for the validity of the proposition “a = a.”
Novalis rejects this strategy on the basis of reflection's inability to represent identity.
For Novalis, in the proposition “a = a” we do not successfully represent identity in itself
but rather represent it through a positing, a differentiating, and a combining (FS:1). To
say that  a  is  a  is to make a judgement.  In this  judgement of identity both  a  and  a
become posited. However, insofar as both are posited as two terms of a judgement the
two are also differentiated. It is only through the copula that both are combined in the
judgement  in  order  to  present  them  as  identical.  The  identity  presented  in  the
proposition “a = a” is therefore not a simple, or analytic one,  but rather an identity
constructed out a compound of two terms. In other words, it is a synthetic identity. In
this way we misrepresent the unity that would underlie the possibility of the proposition
“a = a” where each a would be a term which is only made possible by this prior unity,
by representing  the  unity as  secondary to,  and also  composed  of,  the  terms  of  the
judgement. Thus, "we abandon the identical in order to present it" and an attempt at a
presentation of identity merely produces an “illusory proposition” (FS:1).
We can also apply this logic to Fichte's judgement of self-consciousness, to the
“I am I” through which we become aware of the self-constituting act of consciousness.
In the judgement “I am I” we don't find an underlying unity between our I in the subject
and our I in the object position. Rather, the identity we find between the two has been
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constructed through the copula, such that the absolute ego (as found in reflection) does
not underlie the self and the not-self but rather appears as a compound of these former
two.  Insofar  as  its  identity  can  not  be  guaranteed  by our  reflection,  and insofar  as
reflection merely produces illusory propositions, and Fichte's proof of the I as a first
principle of philosophy relies on this proposition, the I can not be a proper candidate for
a first principle of philosophy. In addition, since the absolute is the ground of all being it
must itself be prior to that being. Insofar as we are unable to represent such an identity
as prior to its own terms we must also be unable to grasp the absolute itself, and the
possibility of a complete system of philosophy is therefore also rejected.
The second argument against the possibility of philosophy comes out of Novalis'
discussion of feeling and thought. Although Novalis rejects Fichte's I as a first principle
of consciousness Novalis himself starts with consciousness and an attempt to find its
ground. However, unlike Fichte, Novalis maintains that we find ourselves incapable of
discovering this and instead of being able to find a single source of consciousness and
thought we find two, feeling and reflection (FS:15-6). Feeling is described as a sense for
the original act, for that which consciousness relies on but which it can not be made
responsible for. This places a limit to philosophy's potential reach such that “the borders
of feeling are the borders of philosophy” (FS:15). Insofar as feeling stands opposed to
reflection, reflection is unable to comprehend it,  and should it attempt to do so “the
spirit of feeling” would then be “gone” (FS:15). Both feeling and reflection contribute
to intuition, and here Novalis introduces another sceptical conclusion (FS:16). Similar
to how our attempts at representing identity negate that very identity, so do our attempts
at feeling or reflecting invert the order of being of their objects. Novalis writes, 
“In consciousness  it  must  appear  as  if  it  went  from the  limited  to  the
unlimited, because consciousness must proceed from itself as limited – and
this  happens  through  feeling  -  without  consideration  of  the  fact  that
feeling, regarded abstractly, is a progression from unlimited to limited –
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this inverted appearance is natural” 
(FS:17)
Philosophy begins with consciousness and attempts to find its unconditioned ground.
Therefore it  starts  with our limited,  empirical consciousness and moves towards the
unlimited,  its  ground. It  therefore begins to  look for the original  act  through which
consciousness arises, which it must do through feeling. This is because we only have a
feeling (or belief) for the original act since, as that which first makes awareness possible
it can not be an object of awareness itself. Insofar as the object of feeling is the act that
grounds our limited empirical consciousness, feeling moves from the unlimited to the
limited.  The error  of  reflection  is  that  it  attempts  to  move  from the  limited  to  the
unlimited by way of a mode of 'knowing' which requires a movement in the opposite
direction.  Therefore,  in  the  same  way  that  our  attempts  at  representing  identity
understand it as a composition of objects rather than a prior unity out of which these
objects are derived, our attempts at understanding the absolute ground of consciousness
reverse the order of its being, understanding our only access to it as a progression from
the limited to the unlimited as opposed to its proper order. Since the absolute is the
originally unlimited ground of everything understanding is therefore also incapable of
grasping the absolute.
The last argument Novalis gives for the impossibility of knowing the Absolute
follows  a  common  strategy  at  the  time.  The  argument  simply  states  that  since  all
knowledge  is  conditioned  knowledge  then  knowledge  of  the  absolute,  or  the
unconditioned, is by definition impossible. In Novalis' terms it appears as such: 
“All  reflection  relates  to  an  object.  An  object  as  such,  however,  is
determined by the original oppositions. I can thus only think a determinate
thing – the undetermined is only thinkable as opposite, but insofar as the
opposite is an object, it is already determined by itself”
(FS:278)
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Reflection depends on the positing of an object in opposition to consciousness. Even
before any categories of thought might make their appearance all objects must stand
under the condition of objectivity in general which for Novalis means simply that they
can  be  opposed  to  a  consciousness.  Insofar  as  even  this  basic  pre-supposition  of
consciousness having any object is a determination so must consciousness be unable to
grasp the undetermined, or the absolute.
Philosophy begins with reflection on a ground. It aims at the pre-subjective, pre-
objective,  singular,  unconditioned  ground  of  all  thinking  and  being.  It  aims  at  the
absolute ground. However, due to the nature of reflection, the discovery of this ground
is impossible for us. For us, the concept of an absolute ground contains an impossibility.
“The drive to philosophize” is therefore nothing but an “unending activity” (FS:566).
Philosophy contains a desire which it may never fulfil.  Instead, “unending free activity
in us arises through the free renunciation of the absolute – the only possible absolute
that can be given to us and that we only find through our inability to know an absolute”
(FS:566). The only absolute we might find is the negative absolute of the impossibility
of our finding an absolute. We can neither find it nor can we begin with it and thus “all
searching for a single principle would be like the attempt to square the circle” (FS:566).
Having covered the sceptical dimension of the Fichte Studies we will now turn
to  Novalis'  later  fragments  as  well  as  Das Allgemeine Brouillon.12 The  aim of  Das
Allgemeine  Brouillon is  to  find  and  present  the  underlying  unity  found  within  all
sciences. In this way, the task of the encyclopedia represents the ideal of knowledge,
that through which all our other knowledge can be organised in its interdependence and
coherence. In one of the earliest entries in the  Brouillon Novalis laments the fact that
12 The word 'later' is a misnomer. The Fichte Studies were written from 1795 to 1796 while the 
Brouillon and fragments were written in the time between 1797 (starting with the Logological 
Fragments) to 1800 (ending with the Last Fragments). However, that there is a break between these 
two periods will become clear below and this break in thought is also documented in (Stone, 2008).
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“there is as yet no physics—there are only isolated physical sciences” (AB:8). This is
why Novalis sets himself the task of working his  “way through all the sciences—and
collect  material  toward  encyclopedistics.  First  the  mathematical  sciences—then  the
others—philosophy, morality etc. last of all.” (AB:229). Encyclopedistics is defined by
Novalis as the basis of science itself, as that science which “I make it into a universal
science and order it under itself—and consider all the other sciences as a modification
of it” (AB:90, 155). Given Novalis' sceptical disposition in the Fichte Studies we might
question why Novalis thought such a project would be possible.  The reason Novalis
thinks this project might be possible is because, as Alison Stone points out, for Novalis,
all sciences ultimately deal with relations. This is so because the particular objects with
which the sciences are concerned are constructed out of their relations with each other
(Stone, 2008, p.155). Novalis confirms this early on in the Brouillon when he writes that
“our world is what it is as a member of the universal system of the world. Its changes
are determined in conjunction with the changes in the larger system” (AB:113). This
relation  holds  not  only  for  our  world  but  also  for  particular  things  as  “everything
distinct, is only  distinct and  individual—insofar as it is already defined in a system”
(AB:79). The burden for the rest of the text is then to show that such uniform relations
are in fact multiply instantiated across different scientific disciplines which will also
allow Novalis to show exactly what these relations consist of as well as demonstrate the
unity of all the sciences.
However, we will be focusing not on the particular relations Novalis takes to
hold between objects and their correspondence across scientific disciplines but rather on
the philosophical import this methodology has for Novalis. One of the most interesting
consequences Novalis' new focus on the sciences has for his philosophy is the emphasis
he  now  places  on  empiricism.  In  numerous  fragments  Novalis  talks  about  the
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importance of understanding nature in order to understand ourselves. True criticism is
for Novalis the methodology that in the study of our self brings us out to the external
world in observations and experiments (AB:820). Novalis even goes as as to say, in an
entry titled “Philosophy,” that “idealism is nothing but genuine empiricism” (AB:402).
Along  with  the  external  world  being  necessary  for  understanding  ourselves,
mathematics is that discipline through which the external world should be understood.
In  the  Freiberg  Natural  Scientific  Studies  Novalis  writes  that  “all  sciences  should
become mathematics. Up to now, mathematics has merely been the first and simplest
expression or revelation of true scientific spirit. The numerical system is the model for a
genuine system of linguistic signs - The letters of our alphabet shall become numbers,
our language, arithmetic,” adding later that “physics is real mathematics” (FNSS:9, 11). 
None  of  this  stands  in  opposition  to  the  Fichte  Studies however.  The  move
towards the empirical is motivated by the sceptical conclusions reached in this earlier
work, after all we still “seek the absolute everywhere and only ever find things” (MO:1).
That we attempt to understand ourselves by turning towards nature should come as no
surprise either. It is merely the natural consequence of the fact that reflection, due to its
own limitations, reverse the order of being. Insofar as reflection reverses what it reflects
upon we must re-reverse our attempts at understanding our object, understanding nature
through the self and the self through nature. This is also why Novalis, in the same entry,
refers to criticism as including “the method of inversion” (AB:820).
Although the 'outward gaze'13 we find in empiricism seems to follow on from the
conclusions  reached  in  the  Fichte  Studies there  are  at  least  two  elements  of  the
Brouillon and later fragments that seem to stand opposed to the framework laid out in
the  earlier  work,  namely  Novalis'  magical  idealism  and  his  organicism.  The  basic
13 “The first step will be an inward gaze – an isolating contemplation of ourselves. Whoever stops here 
has only come halfway. The second step must be an outward gaze – autonomous, constant observation
of the external world” (MO:26). 
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principle of magical idealism is that the external world should be just as determinable
by our will as our internal 'world' is. In the same way that we can direct our thoughts
spontaneously, so should we be able to control nature itself. In the Brouillon this 'magic'
is linked to what Novalis refers to as a “mystical theory of language” (AB:137). This
links with Novalis' contention that the movements and changes of the universe are a
form of  communication,  “Everything  we  experience  is  a  communication.  Thus  the
world is  indeed a communication,”  such that  “the universe also speaks—everything
speaks” (LFII:54, AB:143). This might seem like a mystical doctrine, not in the least
because Novalis uses that very word, but it might be more commonsensical than it first
appears.  The  conviction  that  nature  is  a  communication  depends  merely  upon  the
perspective or aim one takes up. If one wishes to discover the laws and processes that
underlie nature then what is nature doing but communicating the answer to that question
through  its  manifestations  of  those  laws  and processes?  That  there  is  some sort  of
language at the bottom of these processes14 does not mean anything other than that these
processes can be expressed in some discursive way, which is nothing other than a basic
condition  of  their  intelligibility  for  us  since  our  intellect  is  discursive.  In  fact,  we
already know the language that Novalis takes to lie at the basis of all things, namely
mathematics. Insofar as we can understand nature the workings of nature, which we do
through mathematics,  we will  also be able  to  manipulate  those  workings  to  control
nature at our will, which is all magic means for Novalis (AB:322). After all, “the active
use  of  our  organs  is  nothing  more  than  magical,  wonder-working  thinking,  or  the
arbitrary  use  of  the  physical  world—for  willing  is  nothing  more  than  the  magical,
powerful faculty of thought”(AB:1075). 
The next aspect of the Brouillon and fragments that stands out in opposition to
the  scepticism  of  the  Fichte  Studies is  Novalis'  organicism.  In  her  article  "Being,
14  “A grammatical mysticism lies at the basis of everything” (AB:138)
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Knowledge, and Nature in Novalis" Alison Stone gives an account both of the nature of
Novalis'  organicism and the epistemological  consequences  of  this,  and an important
question regarding Novalis'  scepticism arises out of this article.  In the article,  Stone
attempts to reconcile Frank's sceptical realist reading of Novalis with Beiser's organicist
and absolute idealist interpretation by giving an account of the development of Novalis'
non-scepticism in the writings following the Fichte Studies. Stone sees the development
of Novalis' thought to consist in the move from the unknowability of being to holding
that being is knowable as self-organising nature which, due to its spontaneity, only gives
us access to its forms of organization without knowledge of why those particulars forms
of organization manifest  themselves (Stone,  2008, p.141).  She also takes it  that this
move is motivated by the difficulties inherent in Novalis' attempt to re-enchant a nature
which in its finite manifestations, and by the account of experience given in the Fichte
Studies, necessarily appears as comprehensible, mechanistic, and lifeless (Stone, 2008,
p.148,  151).  For  Stone,  in  order  to  address  this  issue,  Novalis  moves  towards  an
organicist view of nature in which the meaning of natural objects is guaranteed by their
reference to an infinite amount of similarly structured phenomena that arise out of the
self-organisation  of  nature,  the  reference  of  which  need  only  be  made  apparent  by
science (thereby making the object enchanted) (Stone, 2008, p.154-5). Insofar as nature
is organically self-organising and unitary we can throughout nature make apparent the
systems of organisation which nature has produced for itself in characteristically organic
patterns and therefore also make the character of nature,  or the absolute,  intelligible
(Stone, 2008, p.157). In this way knowledge of the absolute becomes possible through
science itself, provided that science(s) do(es) not merely disclose nature as mechanistic
and lifeless  (Stone,  2008,  p.158).  However,  insofar  as  nature  is  free,  since  there  is
nothing  external  to  nature  through  which  it  could  be  determined,  the  forms  of  its
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organisation  must  be  the  result  of  its  spontaneous  activity  and  must  therefore  be
unintelligible to us (Stone, 2008, p.158, 160). Nature is therefore only knowable insofar
as its organisation is concerned, while the reason for its particular organisation is not
something of which we could gain knowledge.
Stone's article raises an important question of the role of scepticism in Novalis'
writings  following  the  Fichte  Studies. Although  the  tone  of  the  later  writings
indisputably change, the scepticism for the most part remains. Let us begin with the
knowability of the absolute. This is a recurring theme for Novalis,  from the 1975-6
Fichte Studies, through to his 1798  Teplitz Fragments  and finally his  Last Fragments
dated to 1800 before his death in 1801. The Teplitz Fragments are perhaps most telling
since they seem to suggest the sort of anti-scepticism that Stone and Beiser take to be a
characteristic  of  Novalis'  later  works,  while  on  second  glance  we  find  that  the
scepticism  remains.  One  instance  of  this  non-scepticism  is  Novalis'  remark  that
“nothing is more attainable for the spirit than the infinite” (TF:14). At this point there
are two possible candidates for the infinite Novalis is referring to. There is Being-in-
itself, and, going back to the fragment in the Fichte Studies on renunciation, there is the
infinite activity that arises out of our renunciation of the possibility of knowing the
absolute, which Novalis took to be "the only possible absolute that can be given to us
and that we only know and find through our inability to attain and know an absolute"
(FS:566). So is Novalis referring to infinite renunciation or infinite being? The answer
is found in another Teplitz Fragments in which Novalis writes, on women, “are they not
similar to the infinite in that they cannot be squared, but can be found only through
approaching  them?”  (TF:17).  By  invoking  the  notion  of  approaching  we  find  that
Novalis is still deeply situated within the framework of infinite approximation which is
a cornerstone of Frühromantik as a sceptical movement. The language of the fragment
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also harks back to  the  Fichte Studies in which Novalis  says  of the impossibility of
finding a  first  principle  that  “all  searching for  a  single  principle  would  be  like  the
attempt  to  square  the  circle”  (FS:566).  If,  for  Novalis,  the  attempt  to  understand a
woman is like the attempt to square the circle,15 and it is the same with the infinite, then
the infinite that it is so easy for the spirit to attain can not be infinite Being, but only the
infinite renunciation of our possibility of knowing the infinite itself. This scepticism in
infinite  approximation  carries  through  to  Novalis'  Last  Fragments wherein  Novalis
simply writes "philosophy will never be complete" (LF:39).
This scepticism is also central to the  Brouillon. As we've seen the aim of the
Brouillon  is to find the the underlying unity of all sciences, philosophy included. The
aim is to find that single element which we could use to organise our entire body of
current and future knowledge. In essence, it is the search for a single principle. In the
very same text,  illustrating his continued anti-foundationalism, Novalis  reiterates the
impossibility of finding such a principle when he writes that “every science has its God,
that is also its goal … Philosophy seeks a first and single principle. The mathematician,
the  squaring  of  the  circle”  (AB:314).  Again  first  principles  are  compared  to  the
impossibility  of  squaring  the  circle.  This  does  not  mean  that  Novalis'  attempt  at
discovering this unity is self-contradictory. We can still approximate this unity and as
philosophers we should be concerned with approximating it as closely as possible. The
impossibility of completion does not necessitate the impossibility of progress.
I have already said why I take Novalis'  empiricism to be consistent with the
Fichte Studies, what is less obvious is how his magical idealism is not entirely anti-
sceptical.16 After all, the call for us to control nature such that we can control our own
world seems to be a call both for the complete understanding of nature itself and, and
15 Offensive as the comparison is.
16 The sceptical dimensions of Novalis' organicism will be explored as part of my critique of Beiser's 
interpretation of Novalis.
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when such control has been established, the ability to explain nature entirely by way of
the  self  that  controls  it.  However,  Novalis'  magical  idealism is  not  anything  more
mystical than an adaptation and re-phrasing of Fichte's practical imperative that the self
should determine the  not-self. This  is  found in  the practical  part  of  the  Grundlage,
wherein Fichte considers the proposition “the self posits the not-self as limited by the
self” (I,  125). For Fichte, insofar as the self is viewed as an intelligence, that is,  as
empirical consciousness, the self is determined under the mode of being a presenting
being (I, 248). However, this self differs from the self in general, or the self considered
in abstraction from its specific determinations (I, 248). Now the self in general, or the
absolute self, was supposed to provide the ground for the absolute identity of the self,
but insofar as the self is determined by the not-self it stands opposed to the absolute self
(I, 249). This creates a demand for the self as the validity of the judgement 'I am I' is
contradicted by the dependence of the self on the not-self.  In order to reinstate this
identity  the  not-self  will  have  to  be  shown to  be  determined  by the  self  (I,  249).
However, there is a contradiction implicit in this demand. In order for the self to be a
self at all it must oppose something to itself. If the self were to completely determine the
not-self it would then become a part of the self such that it would no longer be opposed
to it and the self would no longer be a self at all (I, 254). The self must therefore aim to
make the world subject to its will knowing that this task could never be completed even
if it is the demand of practical reason itself. Both in magical idealism and in Fichte's
demand of practical reason we find the same notion of making the world subject to our
will. Just as we are able to direct our internal world, our thoughts, at will so should we
be able to direct the external world and its objects. In Novalis this is to occur through
science and through the control of our own sensory organs. However, in both Novalis
and Fichte the aim is one which will never be achieved. In Fichte its accomplishment
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would mean the end of the ego, and in Novalis it will never be completed since such a
task would require a comprehensive knowledge of nature which by its very infinity is
impossible.
Given all of this, what is the role and methodology of philosophy? Philosophy
begins with the search for an absolute ground but finds that this goal in itself contains
an impossibility.  However,  as  philosophers  we are still  aiming for  the maximum of
knowledge and for truth. It is just that this goal in itself will never be completed. Truth
is therefore now recast as an “inward, inherent harmony and concordance,” an inner
coherence of  all  thought  which can never  be verified but  which at  every stage can
become ever more probable (AB:881). In order to achieve this coherence philosophy
has to overcome the contradictions that arise from taking merely partial viewpoints of
the universe (KS:47). All standpoints on the absolute are relative insofar as they are not
the standpoint of the absolute and are therefore false with regards to the whole. This is
partially the project undertaken in the  Brouillon. By showing the underlying unity of
disparate disciplines of science their partiality is removed and their oppositions shown
to be illusory. The task of philosophy then is to overcome these partialities in order to
infinitely  approximate  the  ideal  of  total  knowledge.  Specifically,  “philosophy
disengages  everything—relativizes  the  universe—And  like  the  Copernican  system,
eliminates the fixed points—creating a revolving system out of one at rest. Philosophy
teaches the relativity of all reasons and all features—the infinite diversity and unity in
the constructions of one and the same thing etc.” (AB:622)
Novalis and Beiser on Absolute Idealism
Having covered some of the main features of Novalis' philosophy we can now
move on to critically evaluating Beiser and Frank's interpretation. As we saw in the last
chapter, Beiser interprets Novalis, along with the other Frühromantiker, as an absolute
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idealist  and  takes  absolute  idealism  to  be  characterised  by  a  commitment  to  the
existence of the absolute, a rejection of Fichte coupled with a sympathy for Spinoza and
monism, an adherence to the theory of forms, vitalism, the identification of the universe
with an organism in a constant process of development according to some determinate
idea,  an  adherence  to  naturalism,  and  the  positing  of  the  real  and  ideal  as  merely
“different degrees of organization and development of a single living force” rather than
distinct  substances  (Beiser,  2008,  p.367).  As  we saw,  Beiser's  interpretation  is  also
thoroughly  anti-sceptical.  Beiser  claims  that  any  sceptical  reading  of  the
Frühromantiker comes as a result of focusing solely on earlier manuscripts and ignoring
the  later  writings  of  the  Frühromantiker.  Combining  all  of  these  features  together,
Beiser defines absolute idealism as “the doctrine that everything is a part of the single
universal organism, or that everything conforms to, or is an appearance of, its purpose,
design, or idea” (Beiser, 2008. p.352) 
It is within this framework that Beiser locates Novalis' philosophy. Even though
Beiser dismisses sceptical readings of Novalis he does spend time on the Fichte Studies
uncovering what he takes to be its main argument. However, insofar as Beiser takes
Novalis to later reject the consequences of these arguments we will focus on Beiser's
reading of the later Novalis. The two elements of Novalis' writings which Beiser takes
to  be  definitive  (apart  from  the  Fichte  Studies)  is  his  magical  idealism  and  his
syncretism. 
As we have seen the aim of magical idealism is to extend the power of will over
nature such that we can live in a world of which we are the authors (Beiser,  2008,
p.422-3).  This  is  a  form of  idealism since  it  ultimately  wishes  to  make  perception
dependent on our own creative activity, and it is a form of magic since it is an attempt at
exercising control over nature through reason (Beiser, 2008, p.423). It is also merely
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regulative ideal which we should strive for but can never attain. For Beiser this presents
a fusing of Kant and Fichte insofar as for Kant we know what we create and for Fichte
making depends on willing, whereas in magical idealism, the world depends on the will
(Beiser,  2008, p.423-4).  Beiser  also maintains  that  there is  a  realist  side to magical
idealism which consists in learning when to be passive and integrate oneself with nature
since the ultimate goal is a harmony of energy and passivity (Beiser, 2008, p.424).
The second part of Beiser's interpretation of Novalis concerns his syncretism.
This  is  aimed  at  being  a  form of  criticism which  fuses  idealism and  realism,  and
involves understanding nature as mind and mind as nature. The theoretical underpinning
of syncretism is its symbolic physics which takes it that the visible can symbolize the
invisible and vice versa. The soul also symbolizes the body and the body symbolizes the
soul and the world is a communication, or revelation, of spirit (Beiser, 2008, p.430).
syncretism's idealist dimension is that we know things only insofar as we can make
them accord with our own laws, while the realist dimension is that we know things only
insofar as we make ourselves into the object and alienate ourselves. These meet in the
fact that “I create and extend the nature of the object by making it conform to me; and I
create and extend myself by making it conform to the object” (Beiser, 2008, p.432). In
syncretism objects  become determinate  through  their  being  known.  In  this  way the
distinction between an object's determinacy and the knowledge of it falls apart and they
turn out to be almost the same thing (Beiser, 2008, p.432). Conversely, the knowing
subject also only becomes what it is through knowing objects (Beiser, 2008, p.432).
This fuses idealism and realism since in idealism we see subject as cause of the object,
in realism we see the object as cause of the subject, and in syncretism they are both the
cause of each other's determinacy (Beiser, 2008, p.432)
As  we  saw in  the  last  chapter,  Beiser's  characterisation  of  the  romantics  as
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absolute  idealists  fails  as  a  result  of  the  inherent  scepticism  of  the  romantics,  a
scepticism which we've seen repeated in Novalis. However, there are aspects of Beiser's
interpretation that must be correct. Most importantly, the features which Beiser takes to
be salient  to an interpretation of Novalis  all  take into account his  attempt at  fusing
idealism and realism. In syncretism the world as determinate both through objectivity
and subjectivity only arises out of their mutual determination. In magical idealism we
should aim to be as much in harmony and passive with nature as we should try to
control it. The account of realism as it relates to magical idealism might seem strange
but the most important thing is Beiser's attempt to interpret magical idealism in a way
consistent with Novalis' aim to find a middle ground between the two. 
The question now becomes, having established his reading of magical idealism
and  syncretism,  why  does  Beiser  insist  on  characterising  Novalis  as  an  organicist
absolute idealist? It  is  at  this  point that Beiser's  interpretation falters, as it  concerns
Novalis' inherent scepticism and our ability to know the absolute itself. If it turns out
that Beiser is wrong to take it that Novalis holds the absolute to be an organically self-
organising form of being of whose rationality everything is merely an appearance, then
regardless of how correct his interpretation of magical idealism or syncretism is, we
could still say that he is wrong to classify Novalis as an absolute idealist.
So  what  does  Novalis  say  about  the  absolute?  In  the  Fichte  Studies he  is
adamant that we can know nothing about the absolute or its nature. However, insofar as
Beiser dismisses sceptical readings that focus on Novalis' earlier writings, relying on
what Novalis says in the Fichte Studies would have little force. We must therefore look
at what Novalis had to say about the nature of the absolute in his later writings. Perhaps
the most important place is the  Brouillon  in which Novalis seems to suggest that the
universe is in some sense a self-organising organism. He writes, 
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“the life process … and the structuring process determine individuality—
Its complete study conveys to us the natural ... every individual life process
is codetermined by the universal life process ... ultimately by the natural
system of the universe ... therefore, one can justifiably call the complete
natural system of a perfect individual—a function of every other perfect
individual—and a function of the universe” 
(AB:460)
That there is a universal life process and a natural system of the universe suggests the
existence of a process of organisation that takes an organic form which is ascribed to
nothing less than the universe itself. However, this remark is immediately revoked when
Novalis writes 
“therein  lies  perhaps  the  character  of  a  complete individual.  An
incomplete individual would have an incomplete natural system—which is
indicated by an incessant striving, a feeling of dissatisfaction, a deficiency
—a boundlessness”
(AB:460).
The end of the quote is reminiscent of the fragment from the  Fichte Studies in which
Novalis tells us the only absolute we can ever achieve is that of infinite renunciation, the
absolute which realises itself through our inability to find any absolute. That it is the
latter position, the one concerned with deficiency rather than the completeness of an
organicist absolute, that Novalis thinks we should be concerned with becomes clear in
another fragment from the Brouillon titled “Pathological Philosophy” in which Novalis
derides the philosopher who aims for completeness,
 “an absolute drive for perfection and completeness is morbid … as soon
as it shows itself to be destructive and adverse to what is imperfect, and
incomplete. If we want to attain and accomplish something definite, then
we must also set up provisional and definite limits” 
(AB:638). 
Those who refuse to do so are named, somewhat confusingly, either 'Magical Idealists'17
or  'Magical  Realists.'  They  are  those  who  attempt  to  explain  the  entire  content  of
17 This is not necessarily a rejection of Novalis' own doctrine, but rather a critique of any position, 
including his own, when combined with a totalising tendency unaware of its own limits
56
metaphysics from their respective beginning in the objective or subjective,18 and their
one-sidedness is both a 'logical affliction' as well as a type of delusion (AB:638). While
idealism and realism must be combined, since a comprehensive view must encapsulate
and subsume all  one-sided interpretations  of  the  same subject  matter,  they must  be
combined within a system that recognises its own limits. Therefore, while the organicist
and natural system of the universe would be the character of a complete individual, such
an  individual  would  also  be  guilty  of  pathological  philosophy  for  Novalis,  and  it
becomes clear that for Novalis the absolute should remain unknowable in its particular
nature.
However,  Beiser  might  counter  this  criticism  with  some  passages  in  which
Novalis speaks in organicist terms without the reservations I attribute to him,19 and by
pointing out that the only thing which could sustain Novalis' notions regarding magical
idealism would be a thoroughly organicist view. However, we have to remember the
status of any claims to knowledge within Novalis' scepticism. While Novalis' natural-
scientific findings seem to suggest the inner coherence of all of nature within a self-
developing totality,  such findings can never acquire  the certainty that  they would if
derived from a first principle. Since the possibility of such first principles is rejected by
Novalis the task of philosophy is the continued attempt to organise and systematise our
empirical findings.  Within this task organicism can only arise as a tentative attempt
which  might  be  superseded  by  other  forms  of  organisation  that  more  closely
approximate  the  absolute.  Organicism  therefore  appears  as  an  attempt  out  of  the
findings  of  empirical  science,  and  not  as  the  organising  principle  of  our  empirical
knowledge in the way Beiser suggests.  This would be to treat  organicism as a first
principle whose claim to truth is absolute, something which Novalis would categorically
18 Analogous to the idealist and dogmatist from Fichte's Introductions to the Science of Knowledge
19 See for example (AB:477)
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reject. All we can say about the absolute without reservation seems to be what is true by
definition of it being the absolute. Specifically, that the absolute is the unity of every
opposition and that “the universe is the absolute subject, or the totality of all predicates”
(AB:633).  Therefore,  although  Beiser's  interpretation  of  Novalis'  syncretism  and
magical idealism takes into account his attempt to find a middle point between idealism
and realism his overarching absolute idealist interpretation ignores the scepticism that
remains constant throughout Novalis' writings and which make it impossible to ascribe,
in absolute terms, an organicist absolute idealism to him.
Novalis and Frank on Realism
While  Beiser  stresses  the  absolute  idealist  aspect  of  Novalis,  Frank's
interpretation stresses the realist and sceptical dimensions found in the writings. Frank
focuses primarily his reading on the Fichte Studies. For Frank the text has three main
elements. First,  to raise the question of how there can be any consciousness of that
which  exceeds  and  grounds  our  cognitive  capabilities.  Secondly,  to  show  how  the
thought  of  an  absolute  unity  can  be  in  harmony  with  the  thought  of  a  unity  that
articulates  itself  into  oppositions.  Lastly,  to  show  that  Being  must  be  beyond
consciousness  and  that  philosophy  consists  in  infinite  approximation  (Frank,  2004,
p.163). It is in the elements that emerge from the considerations of the first of these
theses that Frank locates Novalis' realism. The first of these elements to arise is Novalis'
account of judgement. For Novalis, consciousness is incapable of grasping Being in its
self-identity insofar as it must represent such an identity by the copula in a judgement,
thereby making it a synthetic unity (Frank, 2004, p.164). The second element is Frank's
interpretation of Novalis' claim that “consciousness is a Being outside of Being within
Being” (FS:2). Frank takes this to mean that consciousness' being is dependent on its
being directed towards the only real Being such that consciousness depends on Being
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for its own being and that Being would exist even without consciousness (Frank, 2004,
p.165). Consciousness is in its essence merely a reference to Being, such that without
Being consciousness would not exist. However, the reverse does not hold, Being is not
essentially a referent for consciousness and it would subsist even if consciousness did
not (Frank, 2004, p.167). Here we have Novalis' ontological realism, “Being is prior to
our consciousness; we feel it but don't produce it or even constitute it” (Frank, 2004,
p.169). The third element is the role feeling plays in Novalis' philosophy. Feeling is a
non-discursive apprehension of Being but it also plays another role which comes about
in Novalis'  rejection of intellectual intuition (Frank, 2004, p.169). In order for us to
grasp something as ourselves in a judgement, that is, in order for self-consciousness to
be possible, we must in some way already be 'acquainted' with ourselves (Frank, 2004,
p.171). This is the role feeling plays, as it is the ground of consciousness' immediate
familiarity with itself (Frank, 2004, p.167). Insofar as this pre-supposition can not be
resolved into knowledge, since it is not a form of knowledge itself, consciousness is
unable to “make the presuppositions of its existence comprehensible by its own means”
and we therefore have, according to Frank, a form of epistemological realism since we
“do not possess adequate knowledge of reality” (Frank, 2004, p.28, 178).
There seem to be no faults with the particularities of Frank's reading of Novalis.
The whole reading is backed up with substantial textual proof and Frank continually
supports his interpretation of particularities found in Novalis by showing their similarity
to authors from whom Novalis would have been inspired. Frank's reading also stresses
the thoroughly sceptical element of Novalis' writing. Frank's choice to omit the content
from Novalis' later fragments and the Brouillon might seem odd, but if the case for the
intellectual break from the earlier and later works can be sufficiently made then such a
move is by no means illegitimate.20 
20  Although as I have laid it out I take the main features of Frank's Novalis to be present throughout the 
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The only place at  which it  seems that  Frank transgresses his  own exegetical
duties is not in his interpretation of Novalis per se, but rather in his characterisation of
Novalis as a realist. Frank's main motive for classifying the Frühromantiker as realists
is to make apparent their break from the canon of absolute idealism into which they are
often dissolved. However, this could be accomplished merely through making apparent
their scepticism, their anti-foundationalism, and their notion of infinite approximation,
whereas labelling them as realists  tout court might accomplish too much. After all, it
brings  Frank into  the  arena  of  giving  a  single  definition  of  the  historically  diverse
disciplines  of  both  idealism  and  realism.  Questioning  whether  the  Frühromantiker
should be seen as realists or idealists or something in between might at this point seem
like  frivolous  semantics.  After  all,  if  Frank  is  right  about  everything  else  in  his
interpretation and merely puts a label on it that we are not happy with, then what is the
big deal? The content remains the same in either case. However, this simply can not be
true for the romantics considering that they took it to be central to their philosophical
enterprise to overcome the opposition between these two metaphysical standpoints. We
should therefore be attempting to understand how, in this case Novalis, took himself to
be accomplishing this goal in his rejection of Fichte and his rejection of the possibility
of absolute knowledge, something which Frank fails to do.
Novalis on Idealism and Realism
So how  can  we say that  Novalis  accomplishes  his  goal  of  finding a  middle
ground between idealism and realism? Novalis is perhaps the most difficult of the three
main  Frühromantiker  when it  comes to elaborating the ways in which he should be
interpreted as  finding some way of  combining idealism and realism.  This  difficulty
comes from the thoroughgoing scepticism we find in Novalis' works. While Hölderlin is
works.
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happy to stress the equiprimordial status of both the subjective and the objective and
their unity within the absolute it  is only a confirmation of the latter that we find in
Novalis. In addition, the epistemological constraints which Novalis elaborates on seem
to preclude the possibility of knowledge that would show the combined nature of two
systems of philosophy that in themselves attempt to give an account of the entirety of
Being.
I take it that the question of Novalis' idealism and realism must boil down to
what he takes to be the essence of philosophy. As we saw earlier, Novalis takes the task
of philosophy to be to show everything's relativity to the standpoint of the absolute, to
show how partial viewpoints are false of the whole. In relation to idealism and realism,
Novalis accomplishes this by showing how one can only be fully understood through, or
with, the other. Idealism is relativised insofar as the self is shown to be incapable of
accounting  for  its  own  existence.  In  order  for  the  self  to  recognize  itself  in  self-
consciousness it must have some immediate relationship with itself. This occurs through
feeling. In Fichte intellectual intuition was that through which we became aware of the
original  act  in  which  the  self  constitutes  itself  and  therefore  has  an  immediate
relationship with itself. In other words, through intellectual intuition the I is capable of
accounting for its own existence by reference only to itself. In Novalis however, insofar
as feeling and reflection are both necessary for intellectual intuition, we find that the
self, in order to account for that act through which consciousness is possible, depends
on a mode of 'knowing' which in turns depends on something being given to it (FS:22).
This mode of 'knowing' is feeling, and insofar as it requires something being given to it,
so must the self require some given (of which it can not be found to be the cause) in
order to account for its own consciousness. The self therefore can not account for its
own consciousness with reference merely to itself, and idealism is shown to require a
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counterpart, namely realism. 
This dependence is symmetrical, and realism is relativised insofar as the unity of
the objects of the external world are found to depend upon the ego for the representation
of their unity. Since every existent receives its meaning from its reference to the rest of
the system of which it is a part and the place it occupies within this system, and the
thing in itself is unknowable simply because “it is  absolutely isolated – it is simple
matter,”  nature  is  in  need  of  something  which  can  synthesize  it  and  its  products
(FNSS:20). While the absolute provides nature's ultimate and analytic unity, the ego is
the  only thing  through which  a  synthesis  and unity can  be  brought  to  bear  on  the
manifold of predicates and relations we find within nature. In other words, the ego is the
“simple – synthesizing principle” (FNSS:20). Insofar as our attempt at understanding
nature depends on science, and science depends on the underlying unity of relations that
compose the objects of the various sciences, and this unity relies on the synthesizing
power  of  the  ego,  then  our  understanding  of  nature  must  itself  depend  on  our
understanding  our  ego.  Realism,  the  necessary counterpart  to  idealism,  is  therefore
shown to require its own counterpart, namely idealism. In this way, both idealism and
realism have been relativised as partial viewpoints, and shown to be completed only in
and through the other.
In relativising the supposed total world systems of idealism and realism, and
establishing  the ways  in  which  they pre-suppose  and  are  completed  by each  other,
Novalis' philosophy becomes one which not only combines the two, but establishes a
triadic philosophy whose elements are idealism, realism, and scepticism. As we saw
with  Hölderlin,  even  if  scepticism  provides  the  overarching  structure  to  the
philosophical  process,  some  positive  knowledge  or  intimation  of  the  absolute  is
required, since otherwise the notion of approximation becomes incomprehensible.  In
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Novalis this is provided in feeling, the non-cognitive relation we stand in with Being
itself. While the absolute of free renunciation is “the only possible absolute that can be
given to us,” or the only representable absolute, we have a non-theoretical intimation of
Being itself in the feeling that grounds the possibility of the negative knowledge we can
acquire of the absolute in approximation. The triadic structure of philosophy therefore
has  idealism  and  realism  as  its  primary  elements,  while  scepticism  appears  as  an
essential expression of our inability to complete the philosophical project laid out in
idealism,  realism,  and/or  their  union.  Metaphysics  thereby  takes  precedence  over
epistemology, albeit only for a short time until epistemology reappears to make apparent
our inability to discursively express the metaphysical truths we started out with.
To summarise, then, philosophy begins with the search for an absolute ground.
This  will  be  the  ground  through  which  everything  is  connected  and  wherein  the
subjective and objective, the starting points of idealism and realism respectively,  are
joined,  since  “with  polarity,  there  arises  a  separation  in  what  is  necessarily joined”
(AB:479). However, philosophy can never reach this goal. Such an indifference point is
imponderable,  and the only absolute we can achieve theoretically is  the absolute of
infinite renunciation (FNSS:27). What philosophy can do is approach or approximate
this ideal. This is done through the reconciliation of all contradictions and opposites,
and the relativisation of all supposed total standpoints. In doing this we make apparent
the incompleteness of our own knowledge and move closer to the whole that underlies
these oppositions. The opposition of idealism and realism is only possible on the basis
of a prior unity through which the terms can be opposed, which we have an intimation
of in feeling. While both are partially right about the nature they attempt to understand,
they are also wrong insofar as they reject their opposite,  and both are wrong of the
whole (AB:633). By making their partiality and completion in each other apparent their
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underlying  unity  is  brought  to  the  fore  and  seen  as  something  which  can  only  be
understood through the unification of both (regardless of whether such unification can
ever be completed). That this is Novalis' own view is confirmed in a fragment from the
Brouillon in which he talks of a “new view of idealism and realism” in which he also
speaks of “opposite operations” wherein “the one will exist and be perfected along with
the other” (AB:331).
In  conclusion,  I  take  it  that  we  both  can  and  should  interpret  Novalis'
philosophical  position as occupying a space between idealism and realism. That we
should aim to do this became clear at the start of this chapter when I highlighted some
of the places  where Novalis  makes it  clear  that his  aim is  to find a middle ground
between idealism and realism. In order to find out just how Novalis' exemplifies such a
position I started with a presentation of the aims and some of the sceptical arguments
found in the Fichte Studies. Although philosophy aims at the absolute ground we find
ourselves  incapable  of  reaching  this  through  reflection  since  it  is  incapable  of
representing identity, it reverses the order of being in what it attempts to represent, and
it only gives us conditioned knowledge. We then moved on to some of Novalis' later
works  and  highlighted  some  of  their  differences  from the  earlier  text,  such  as  his
empiricism, his magical idealism, and his organicism. This brought up a question of
scepticism.  As I  showed,  even  the  elements  of  Novalis'  later  writings  that  seem to
reverse his earlier sceptical convictions still contain a sceptical element. Having shown
that scepticism is as much a part of the later as it is the earlier work, I moved on to
Frank and Beiser's interpretations and critiqued these. We found that Beiser's organicist
characterisation of Novalis did not adequately take into account the tentative status of
claims to absolute knowledge that bar us from ascribing organicism to Novalis in toto.
Frank's interpretation was then critiqued for not attempting to take into account Novalis'
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self-proclaimed aim of fusing idealism and realism. Instead,  an interpretation which
takes  this  into  account  can  be  established  on  the  basis  of  Novalis'  relativising  of
idealism and realism as partial standpoints on reality which both presuppose and are
only  completed  through  the  other,  and,  insofar  as  he  takes  this  to  be  one  of  his
philosophical aims, this is also the interpretation we should take to be true of Novalis
himself.
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Chapter 3 – Realism and Idealism in Schlegel
In this chapter I will give an account of Schlegel's idealism and realism while
motivating the view,  as  with the previous  chapters,  that,  at  least  on his  own terms,
Schlegel can and should be seen as occupying a place between idealism and realism.
Due to Schlegel's conversion to Catholicism and turn to conservatism later in his life we
will focus mostly on his early romantic period writings, dating from around 1794 to
1808. Most of Schlegel's  writings are metaphilosophical and concern the nature and
aims of philosophy and I will begin by summarising what Schlegel takes to be the main
features of philosophy, giving particular focus to the ways in which he separates himself
from  and  critiques  Fichte  and  what  role  these  criticisms  had  for  Schlegel's  own
conclusions about the nature of philosophy. I will then move on to notes taken from
some  of  Schlegel's  lectures  on  philosophy  in  which  Schlegel  applies  his  meta-
philosophical principles and attempts to establish a philosophy based on these. After
summarising these lecture notes I will begin by rejecting both Frank's and Beiser's one-
sided interpretations  of  Schlegel  before  I  argue  that  we should take  Schlegel  to  be
consistent with his own aim to combine idealism and realism.
Schlegel on Philosophy
Like  the  other  Frühromantiker,  Schlegel  also  wanted  to  find  some  way  of
combining idealism and realism. There are many mentions of this in his writings. For
example,  when discussing  the  need for  a  new mythology to  unify romantic  poetry,
Schlegel, through the character Ludoviko, elaborates on the need to establish this new
mythology through an idealism out of which an “equally unbounded realism must and
will emerge” (DoP:184). Another example is found in Schlegel's fragments where he
claims not only that “all philosophy is idealism, and there exists no true realism except
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that of poetry” but also that “whatever has been done while poetry and philosophy are
separated has been done and accomplished. So the time has come to unite the two”
(Id:96, 108). 
Before we move on to outlining the features Schlegel takes to be essential to
philosophy we  must  make  explicit  Schlegel's  relation  to  the  absolute.  It  is  only in
relation to the absolute and the impossibility of knowing the absolute that these features
become cohesive and gain their true meaning. In distinction to Hölderlin and Novalis,
the absolute in Schlegel functions as a regulative ideal. Only through the idea of an
absolute that transcends all finite thought does finite thought gain the unity that Schlegel
thinks we should aspire to but can never reach. In Schlegel's words, “only in relation to
the  infinite  is  there  meaning  and  purpose”  (Id:3). As  a  merely regulative  ideal  the
absolute has no constitutive role as such, but in relation to whether the absolute is a
mere fiction or not Schlegel writes that “yes, it is a fiction. But an absolutely necessary
one. Our I has the tendency to approach the infinite, and it is only because of the fact
that the I, so to speak, flows toward the infinite, in order to approach it, that we are able
to think the infinite” (TP:247). The absolute, although merely regulative, is still  that
around which Schlegel's entire philosophy is organised and in his lectures Schlegel even
goes so far as constructing the absolute by abstracting away from everything finite.21
As with the other  Frühromantiker  the feature of Schlegel's philosophy which
lays the foundation for most of his other convictions is his anti-foundationalism, which
comes  out  as  a  result  of  a  critique  of  Fichte.  Schlegel's  argument  for  anti-
foundationalism has two steps,  a critique of Fichte's  conception of the I  as the first
principle  of  philosophy  followed  by  a  further  critique  of  the  possibility  of  a
foundationalist programme in general. Schlegel takes it that Fichte's principle can be
21 For a more in-depth discussion of Schlegel's Absolute see (Nassar, 2013). This text also includes 
discussions on Schlegel's critique of first principles among other relevant topics. 
67
summed up in the proposition “The I  posits  itself  absolutely” (Frank,  2004, p.182).
However, this principle is not as self-sufficient as Fichte would have it be. The I as
consciousness can never be self-sufficient in the way that Fichte requires it to be since
consciousness is always intentional. Consciousness must always be conscious of some
thing such that  it  always requires some external  interference that  it  can direct  itself
towards and as such is made dependent on that thing. In Fichte this appears as the check
on consciousness that the absolute Ego creates in order for the I to be an I. Interestingly,
Fichte himself seems to agree with Schlegel's point about the self-sufficiency (or lack
thereof) of the I (although not its consequences) as we can see in the practical part of the
Grundlage where Fichte turns the tables on the I's absoluteness insofar as he takes it that
the I can never entirely determine the not-I since the I would then have no object (I,
254). In the practical part of the Grundlage the I is no longer absolute insofar as it must
posit a not-I in order to be an I proper and it must now continually strive to become
absolute (I, 270). It is this point which Schlegel uses against Fichte. Not only is the I an
unsuitable candidate for the principle of a system of a philosophy since it is now merely
a regulative idea, but for Schlegel, Fichte's “the I posits itself absolutely” is in fact not a
first principle at all but instead a proposition compounded out of two more primitive
propositions, one being the unconditioned proposition that “the I posits itself,” and the
postulate  that  “the  I  should  posit  itself”  (Frank,  2004,  p.181).  Not  only  do  these
propositions  precede  Fichte's  principle  but  these  propositions  themselves  depend on
each other for their comprehensibility. Neither of these are therefore candidates for a
first principle either.22
22 Fichte could counter this claim in a number of ways, which I will only touch on briefly here as it is 
outside the scope of this paper. The first is to question why a regulative ideal could not serve as a first 
principle. Secondly, Fichte could claim that Schlegel's two principles are merely extracted from the 
compounded first principle rather than primitive to it. Fichte could also accuse Schlegel of merely 
establishing a new form of foundationalism, since Fichte's system, like Schlegel's, as we will see, it 
itself based on two opposing principles which are in need of synthesis, namely that “the self posits the 
not-self as limited by the self” and“the self posits itself as determined by the not-self” (I, 125-6).
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This is not  only because they rely on each other,  but because first principles
themselves  are  impossible.  Schlegel  offers  a  few  simple  proofs  to  motivate  this
conclusion. The most convincing is found in his lectures. “The absolute thesis of all
philosophy,”  writes  Schlegel,  “cannot  be  proven  …  it  contains  its  proof  in  itself”
(TP:260).  However,  as critical  philosophers we should not  be willing to  accept  any
proposition or thesis without the possibility of proving it. If a first principle can never
be proven then we should not be willing to accept it. However, it is just this absolute
and  undoubtable  nature  that  first  principles  should  have.  Beiser  outlines  some  of
Schlegel's other proofs for the impossibility of a first principle.  First of all, as critical
philosophers, we should be willing to place any proposition under doubt, and any such
doubt  must  be answered with  another  proposition or  a  proof,  which  in  turn can  be
doubted ad infinitum. If the series of proofs can go back into infinity then no step of that
proof can count as a first principle (Beiser, 2003, p.123-4). The complexity of this series
is increased when we also consider that proofs can be accomplished in several different
ways such that a complete account of any proposition is seemingly endless meaning that
no stage of its regressive justification can be taken to be a first principle (Beiser, 2003,
p.124).
Many of Schlegel's other views on the nature of philosophy are grounded in his
anti-foundationalism, such as his views regarding where philosophy starts and how it
should progress. As we've seen Schlegel rejects the view that philosophy can start with
an absolute and undeniable first principle and then deduce everything else from this
principle.  Without  a  first  principle  philosophy  lacks  a  natural  starting  point.  The
alternative is for Schlegel that "viewed subjectively, philosophy, like epic poetry, always
begins in media res" (AF:84). Without a first principle there is no demand that we either
start somewhere in order to regress to it or start from it and deduce our system. Rather
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we can start from anywhere and indeed we must start somewhere, regardless of where it
might be, in order to start at all. However, since the starting point we choose does not
have  the  sort  of  certainty  that  Descartes  ascribed  to  the  cogito  or  that  of  Fichte's
absolute  I  philosophy takes  on  a  different  form.  Philosophy is  now an  experiment
(TP:241). That is, a venture whose result has no guarantee whatsoever. This is unlike the
foundationalist  approach  to  philosophy whose  results  are  guaranteed  merely  by the
validity of the first principle and the correct application of philosophical methods. So
how does philosophy as an experiment validate itself? After all, it might be that every
step of the process is undertaken correctly but the experiment's starting point was not a
valid starting point at all, at which point its result are negated. Schlegel's answer is that
a system of philosophy vindicates itself not by some isomorphic correspondence to the
way things are in reality but instead by the coherence of each of its parts to each other
(TP:241). If from the arbitrarily chosen starting point we progress to explain everything
else that our system must explain and end up explaining this first starting point on the
basis of this process then our system becomes coherent and cyclical, which is exactly
what a system of philosophy should be for Schlegel since “philosophy is still moving
too much in a straight line; it's not yet cyclical enough” (AF:43)
However, this starting point of philosophy is not entirely arbitrary. Although on
the assumption of the possibility of systematic unity each part should be related to all
the other parts in the system such that each part is a possible starting point the proper
starting  point  of  a  system  of  philosophy  is  found  in  Schlegel's  notion  of  a
Wechselerweis, or reciprocal proof. This comes out as a result of Schlegel's critique of
Fichte's I as a first principle. As we saw, Schlegel takes it that Fichte's “the I posits itself
absolutely”  is  actually composed of two more primitive propositions,  namely “the I
posits itself” and “the I should posit itself.” These two propositions are not valid by
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themselves but are made comprehensible only in and through the other. That is, they
stand in a relation to each other in which both reciprocally ground the validity of the
other,  and  they  therefore  stand  in  a  Wechselerweis.  Schlegel  therefore  replaces  the
foundationalist  starting  point  of  philosophy with  this  notion  of  a  Wechselerweis,  of
principles that reciprocally determine and ground each other and that thereby also set
the scene for the structure of philosophy as one in which every part must be related to
every other part and which must be represented as whole.
Schlegel,  along with Novalis  and Hölderlin,  is  also committed to the idea of
infinite approximation. Schlegel writes that "the essence of philosophy is to seek the
totality  of  knowledge"  (PhF:101).  This  knowledge  must  not  only  be  totally
comprehensive  but  it  must  also  be  absolute  (TP:241).  However,  for  Schlegel  this
knowledge, insofar as it is to be total, must also include not only knowledge of what is
unconditioned but the innumerable number of conditioned entities that are grounded in
the  absolute.  However,  here  we  meet  a  contradiction.  Knowledge,  insofar  as  it  is
discursive, is necessarily conditioned knowledge. Any knowledge of the unconditioned
would represent it as conditioned and would therefore no longer be knowledge of the
unconditioned since  it  would  not  represent  it  as  it  is  in  itself.  In  Schlegel's  words,
“knowledge already denotes conditioned knowledge. The unknowability of the Absolute
is, therefore, an identical triviality“ (KA XVIII: 511, Nr., 64).23 Philosophy is therefore
defined by a lack. It can never accomplish that which in its very essence it sets out to
accomplish. What we are left with is not a nihilism about knowledge or an absolute
scepticism  however.  Clearly  some  systems  of  knowledge  are  more  adequate  than
others24 or  we  might  say  that  they  more  effectively  approximate  the  end  goal  of
philosophy. Philosophy therefore turns out to be an infinite approximation. The spirit
23 Translation taken from (Frank, 2004, p.56)
24 Remembering that the mark of adequacy is coherence and comprehensiveness rather than 
correspondence
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sets  itself  the infinite  task of infinite  knowledge,  a task which it  can only strive to
complete but will never accomplish. At each stage some unity and coherence will be
found in its system until either some contradiction arises within it or from some element
which it had not previously contained, at which point a new system is demanded which,
if  it  overcomes this contradiction,  more closely approximates total  knowledge. "The
idea of philosophy can only be attained through an infinite progression of systems"
(TP:248). At this point the importance of the absolute becomes clear. Only the idea of
an  absolute  can  give  unity  to  the  whole  series  of  systems.  It  is  only  through  the
continuous approximation of the infinite that the series gains continuity, and through the
continuity of the series the absolute becomes ever more probable.25
If  philosophy  is  characterised  by  infinite  approximation  then  insofar  as  no
position can ever be adequate to reality philosophy must also be thoroughly sceptical.
Although  scepticism is  central  to  critical  philosophy for  Schlegel  it  must  occupy a
particular place the elaboration of which we find in another one of Schlegel's criticisms
of Fichte. This criticism concerns Fichte's mysticism and the self-destructive nature of
the three major dogmatic systems of philosophy of which scepticism is a part. These
dogmatic systems of philosophy are scepticism, mysticism, and eclecticism.  All these
systems stand opposed to criticism based on one common feature: they all start with a
wilful, and therefore unphilosophical and dogmatic, positing (PhF:10). Mysticism starts
with  the  wilful  positing  of  some absolute  (PhF:7).  Eclecticism starts  with  a  wilful
destruction of all absolutes (PhF:7). Finally, scepticism begins with the wilful positing
of  an  infinity  of  contradictions  (PhF:9).  As  mentioned,  all  of  these  systems  of
philosophy not only mutually destroy each other but they also 'annihilate' themselves.
First  of  all,  the problem with eclecticism is  that  it  begins  with an absolute  limit  to
knowledge and a rejection of the absolute. However, for Schlegel, such an absolute limit
25 In this way even the process of philosophising and the absolute themselves stand in a Wechselwirkung
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could  only  itself  come  from  something  unconditioned,  that  is,  from  that  which
eclecticism rejects (PhF:6). Secondly, the problem with scepticism is that a consistent
scepticism will in the end refute itself. Otherwise scepticism would have to accept that it
can  refute  only what  is  refutable  in  which  case  there  must  be  some possibility for
knowledge (PhF:6). Finally, the problem with mysticism is, as Schlegel writes, that "if
one is allowed to posit arbitrarily something unconditional, nothing is easier than to
explain everything" (PhF:2). Although we aim to explain everything such an aim should
be based in a good faith attempt to discover the explanation for everything as opposed
to merely positing that which would allow us to explain that which we wish to explain.
In addition, in the end, due the impossibility of complete communication and the nature
of  the  content  of  mysticism (the  absolute),  the  mystic  is  reduced  to  “a  stupefying,
internalized brooding” (PhF:6). 
So why is Fichte a mystic? Because he begins with the wilful positing of an
absolute identity between consciousness and what it is conscious of. As we've seen,
Fichte begins the Grundlage with the search for a principle expressing the act that “lies
at the basis of all consciousness and alone makes it possible,” the proof of which relies
on the universal  truth of the proposition 'A = A'  (I,  91,  93).  In this  proposition the
necessary  connection  between  each  A is  posited  such  that  if  A is  posited  it  must
necessarily be true that it is A (I, 93). However, since this connection, this X, is found in
the self that judges the proposition to be true according to laws, and this X bears a
relation to each A as that which makes one follow of necessity from the other, A must
also be found within the self. (I, 94). This means that any positing of A by the self, since
both it and the laws concerning its necessary consequence are contained within the I, is
absolute  for  the  self,  and it  is  just  this  that  happens  in  self-consciousness.  In  self-
consciousness the I makes itself a reality precisely because it posits itself as an I (I, 94).
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This self-positing relies on the validity of the X, that which gives positing the status of a
necessary  proposition,  since  the  existence  of  the  self  should  follow  from its  mere
positing (as with the A in 'A = A'). Since this X establishes the necessary connection
between  the  absolutely  valid  judgement  'A =  A'  it  must  itself  be  as  valid  as  that
judgement. Therefore, the judgement 'I am I' whereby the I posits itself must also be
absolutely valid  (I,  95).  For  Fichte this  judgement  expresses the act  that  lies  at  the
ground of all consciousness and since this positing also absolutely posits the necessity
of the basic proposition of logic (X) as well as its relation to all possible positing (A),
Fichte concludes that the I must be absolute, and therefore also that “everything that
exists does so only insofar as it is posited in the self, and apart from the self there is
nothing” (I, 99). However, this entire proof rests on the assumption that the self can
enter into the same relation to itself that each A can in the proposition 'A = A.' If it is not
true that the I can enter into such a relation in which the self that is conscious and the
self  that  enters  consciousness  are  absolutely identical  then  their  validity can not  be
guaranteed by the principle of identity (X) and the absolute validity of I has not been
guaranteed. Insofar as Fichte assumes this to be possible he can be said to be a mystic in
the way Schlegel takes him to be.
Despite  his  criticisms  of  Fichte's  mysticism  and  of  scepticism  in  general,
Schlegel believes both are necessary. Schlegel takes it that in the end critical philosophy
will combine all three dogmatic philosophical positions. First of all, although mysticism
stands opposed to critical philosophy since it begins with a wilful (and not knowledge-
ful)  positing  of  an  absolute  it  is  clear  that  Schlegel  takes  it  to  be  important  to
philosophy. After all "the belief that Mysticism and all metaphysics are only a  game
with empty abstractions and formulas rests alone on the eclectic, empiricist point of
view" (PhF:50). If mysticism is not merely a game with empty abstractions it must have
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some important role to play. Mysticism is partially pardoned by Schlegel on the basis
that it is the most economical of the three dogmatic systems (on the basis that it only
posits one contradiction) and that the mystic is the source of their own contradictions
(PhF:9,  13).  However  its  true  value  comes  as  an  essential  component  of  the
philosophical attitude. Mysticism has an important place in critical philosophy insofar
as all philosophy begins with a tendency and a striving towards the absolute (TP:242).
However,  as  opposed  to  Fichte,  true  critical  philosophy  can  never  begin  with  an
absolute as such wilful positing stands opposed to knowledge. Instead philosophy must
combine scepticism and the striving for the absolute. Whereas enthusiasm, or striving
for the infinite, is the positive factor of philosophy, scepticism is the negative factor of
philosophy (TP:242). This will not be the self-annihilating scepticism which begins and
ends with an infinite number of contradictions but a scepticism used as a tool to make
sure no part of philosophy is left untouched by critique (AF:400). If philosophy begins
with  a  mystical  striving  for  the  absolute  whose  existence  and  nature  is  not  merely
posited and a tempered scepticism which submits everything to the tribunal of reason,
then philosophy becomes a constant progression towards the absolute in which each
further  step  is  demanded  by the  failure  of  the  previous  step  as  made  clear  by the
penetrating force of scepticism, and the infinite approximation which must be a part of
philosophy has been achieved.
Scepticism also has a place in philosophy as that which has never been fully
utilised  by  previous  philosophers.  The  sheer  volume  of  Schlegel's  writings  which
concern the nature of philosophy itself as opposed to metaphysics and epistemology
simpliciter stem  from  Schlegel's  dissatisfaction  with  earlier  philosophers.  This
dissatisfaction comes out clearly when Schlegel writes for example that, “nothing is
more rarely the subject  of  philosophy than philosophy itself,”  and “since nowadays
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philosophy  criticizes  everything  that  comes  in  front  of  its  nose,  a  criticism  of
philosophy would be nothing more than justifiable retaliation,” and finally his claim that
his “experience with the greatest philosophers is like Plato's with the Spartans. He loved
and admired them enormously, but continually complained that they stopped halfway”
(AF:1, 56, 48).
The interplay between enthusiasm and scepticism and the infinite progression it
introduces  is  captured  in  Schlegel's  notion  of  irony.  The role  of  irony is  central  to
Schlegel's work. Schlegel writes “irony is the form of paradox. Paradox is everything
simultaneously good and great” (CF:48). The structure of irony is elaborated in Schlegel
with reference to two other literal/aesthetic devices, namely allegory and wit.26 Both
allegory  and  wit  are  introduced  as  solutions  to  the  problem  of  knowing  the
unconditioned.  Since  the  unconditioned  can  not  be  represented  in  conditioned
knowledge our only access to it is through a representation of its unrepresentability.
This is art's role for Schlegel and it must allude to the infinite in an indirect manner that
does not destroy its unconditioned-ness (Frank, 2004, p.207). Art does this in allegory,
which in  the original  Greek ἀλληγορεῖν means 'to  say more/other  than what  one is
saying'. In allegory art alludes to that which it is incapable of making explicit and frees
itself from its finitude insofar as it points towards the infinite (Frank, 2004, p.209). Art
also alludes to the absolute in wit. Schlegel describes wit as the principle of universal
philosophy  and  as  the  result  of  the  unifying  force  of  thought  (AF:220).  It  is  the
presentation of the unifying power of the infinite within the finite (Frank, 2004, p.209).
However, wit can only do this on a minute scale. In the fragment, the unifying power of
wit is focused in on a single point, the only way we could comprehensibly represent the
unifying power of the unconditioned is in its partiality. As Schlegel puts it,  “only by
26 For a fuller treatment of Schlegel's and the romantics' aesthetics in relation to the concept of literature 
and poetry see (Lacoue-Labarthe & Nancy 1988), (Behler, 1993), and (Bowie, 1997)
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means of the sharpest focus on a single point can the individual idea gain a kind of
wholeness”  (CF:109). As  a  partial  but  intense  representation  of  unity  each
representation of wit found in the fragment gains meaning through its relation to the
absolute. But since wit produces only elements isolated from all other elements of the
system it can never produce a complete and coherent system, instead producing merely
a “chaos of systems” (Frank, 2004, p.210). Fragments are perfectly unified in isolation
but  will  never  be unifiable  with other fragments.  In this  way fragments express the
disjointed  nature  of  the  self  and  nature  by continually  contradicting  themselves.  In
addition, it is not just that our epistemic position is so unfortunate that we are bound to
contradict ourselves, but this contradiction itself has epistemic value. After all, “since
nature and man contradict each other so often and so sharply, philosophy perhaps can't
avoid  doing  the  same”  (AF:397).  In  the  fragment,  the  constant  self-dissolution  of
fragments between each other represents and proves the existence of the absolute as the
ability of two fragments to contradict each other is grounded in them being related as
contradictory representations  of  one and the  same thing:  the  absolute  (Frank,  2004,
p.205, 218). The tension between the unifying power of wit and the revelatory power of
allegory leads to the ironical moment in philosophy. In wit the unifying power of the
absolute is focused into a single point, the infinite is limited to be made comprehensible.
However, in allegory, insofar as it alludes to the infinite's true infinity by representing
its unrepresentability, the fragmentary and partial nature of the products of wit is made
explicit. The illusion of unity must then be restored again by wit and is again exposed
by allegory, ad infinitum. The continual and infinite oscillation of this is irony itself.
So far we have only been exposed to what Schlegel takes critical philosophy to
consist in.27 However, in order to understand his relation to idealism and a realism we
27 Here we have elaborated Schlegel's notion of critical philosophy and critique as a philosophical 
approach, to understand Schlegel's notion of critique in relation to the criticism of art see (Benjamin, 
1996)
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also need to know the precise content of such a critical philosophy, which is exactly
what we get in his Introduction to the Transcendental Philosophy where Schlegel gives
us a basic exposition of his system of transcendental philosophy based on the features of
his notion of critical philosophy highlighted above. 
Schlegel's System
"We philosophize – this is a fact," Schlegel begins (TP:240). Philosophy is for
Schlegel a striving for knowledge, and as a complete knowledge, also a striving for
knowledge of knowledge (TP:240-1). This is not his definition of philosophy however,
as this would be to assume the existence of a knowledge of which our knowledge could
be of. Instead, as highlighted earlier, philosophy is an experiment, it has no rigorous
definition as such, and it must merely begin (TP:241). Schlegel does maintain that we
can  say  what  philosophy  should be  however.  Philosophy  should  be  an  absolute
knowledge and as such we should aim to make every step of its construction a necessary
one (TP:241). The methods Schlegel employs are the experimental methods of physics
and the method of construction of mathematics (TP:241). Schlegel also lets us know
that his philosophy will not merely rest on logic since this merely provides the law of
non-contradiction  and  the  principle  of  sufficient  reason  and  since  logic  relies  on  a
correspondence model of truth28 (TP:241).
After these methodological remarks Schlegel then goes over what he takes to be
the  character  of  philosophy.  First,  scepticism,  the  negative  factor  of  philosophy,
concerns itself with the person and his/her limits to knowledge. Second, enthusiasm, the
positive factor of philosophy, is a tendency towards the absolute. The absolute itself also
has a positive and a negative factor, the positive being its unconditionedness in itself,
and the negative being the infinite chain of conditioneds in which the absolute appears
28 Hinting towards his coherence model of truth
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(TP:242).  Third,  philosophy will  deal  with  principles  and  ideas.  Principles  concern
knowledge of  what  is  primitive  and is  opposed to  the  totality,  while  ideas  concern
knowledge of the totality (TP:242). Lastly, the form of philosophy should be absolute
unity, or as elsewhere described  "a thoroughly articulated totality of scientific matter,
connected in a Wechselwirkung and organic connection" (PhF:84, TP:243).
Schlegel then begins his construction of the absolute. The aim of philosophy is
"to seek the commonly shared midpoint of all principles and ideas"29 (TP:243). In order
to  find this  he  abstracts  away from everything which is  not  absolute.  In  doing this
Schlegel constructs the absolute by opposing it to what is abstracted,  the finite,  and
posits it as infinite. However, we now find that we can never abstract away that which
does the positing. In constructing the absolute by abstraction there always remains a
consciousness of the infinite. We therefore have the two principles of philosophy, the
absolute and consciousness. These two stand in a  Wechselerweis  insofar as "the sole
object  of  consciousness  is  the  infinite,  and  the  sole  predicate  of  the  infinite  is
consciousness" (TP:244). With these principles in mind Schlegel begins his fusing of
Fichte and Spinoza. Fichte's philosophy is the philosophy of consciousness, represented
by the equation 
I = non-I
while Spinoza's philosophy is the philosophy of the infinite, represented by the equation
29 We might wonder whether this aim and our supposed tendency towards the absolute are themselves a 
wilful positing on Schlegel's part. To this Schlegel might defend himself on the basis of his 
historicism, a feature we have not covered but a discussion of which can be found in (Millan-Zaibert, 
2007). While Schlegel opposes himself to philosophical commitments that are not themselves 
discovered during the process of philosophy but instead ground and shape that process without 
justification, any such commitments that we do find in Schlegel, like the search for the unconditioned,
might be defended on the basis that philosophy is always historically situated and therefore must be 
expressed by the terms of its context, in this case post-Kantianism.
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what is representable = what is not representable (TP:243).
In order to combine these two systems, Schlegel produces two new formulas
non-I = what is not representable
what is representable = I
It is this latter which Schlegel takes to be the formula for his philosophy, which he also
expresses as "the minimum of the I equals the maximum of nature; and the minimum of
nature equals the maximum of the I" (TP:244). The I and nature stand in a reciprocally
determining relationship such that a greater determining power ascribed to nature means
a  reciprocally  lesser  power  ascribed  to  the  I,  and  vice  versa.  With  these  elements
Schlegel gives a definition of reality: the elements of all reality are consciousness and
the infinite, and reality is the indifference point between the two (TP:244).
With the groundwork laid out, Schlegel continues his exposition with a common
romantic tenet: “All is one, and one is all” (TP:244). For Schlegel this is the middle
point between all principles and all ideas, it "is the principle of all ideas, and the idea of
all  principles"  (TP:244).  From  this  follow  four  axioms.  First,  "principles  are  the
transition from error to truth" (TP:246). Schlegel does not elaborate on this, but we
might suppose that insofar as principles are derived from phenomena and in some way
deal with more general or primitive features of phenomena then principles are the first
step in ascending towards the infinite. The second axiom states that "reality is only in
ideas"  (TP:246).  Third,  "all  knowledge  is  symbolic"  (TP:246).  Finally,  "all  truth  is
relative" since reality, as lying in the middle between the infinite and consciousness is
itself relative (TP:246). Here Schlegel breaks away to counter a possible objection. If all
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truth is relative and the result of a struggle of errors, is not the infinite itself an illusion?
Schlegel answers in the affirmative. Although the infinite is a fiction it is an absolutely
necessary one. It is necessary because the I naturally strives for the infinite and we
therefore  have  a  ground  for  thinking  of  the  infinite30 (TP:247).  Schlegel  ends  this
section with the claim that philosophy is infinite and that "the idea of philosophy can
only be attained through an infinite progression of systems," thereby instantiating the
feature of philosophy as an infinite approximation which we covered earlier (TP:248).
Schlegel now moves on to constructing physics and natural science itself. This
forms the cyclical part of his philosophy. Schlegel will start with an analysis of idealism
and out of this analysis will construct physics by arriving at its method to show how
physics can be derived from idealism. Schlegel will then continue the constructions out
of the terms already constructed in order to show that eventually we can construct the
methods  of  mathematics,  history,  and  lastly  physics,  at  which  point  a  cycle  of
construction has been completed and some sort of coherence in Schlegel's system has
been achieved. I will not be critiquing this section for two reasons. First of all, I merely
wish  to  demonstrate  Schlegel's  implementation  of  his  conviction  that  the  form  of
philosophy is cyclical. Secondly, since these are student notes the notes are incomplete
and contain no justification or elaboration on each construction.
Schlegel begins by giving a short  analysis  of idealism. Idealism consists,  for
Schlegel, in dualism and realism. Dualism is the negative factor of idealism that takes it
that there are two activities and no substance, while realism is the positive factor which
takes  it  that  there  is  one single substance  (TP:251).  Dualism is  concerned with  the
empirical realm while realism is concerned with theory and identity (TP:251-2). Joining
dualism and theory gives us mathematics since it proceeds from elements and produces
30 Schlegel thereby reverses the relation between our intimation of Being and the approximation to it as 
we have seen in Hölderlin and Novalis
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everything else out of these (TP:252). Joining realism and the empirical gets us history
since this is farthest  removed from mathematics and constructed out of its opposing
elements  (TP:252).  If  we now join the  concern  of  mathematics  and theory,  that  is,
elements and identity "so that the two activities must be contained in one, the result is
what one calls a sphere" (TP:253). If we join substance and duplicity (the character of
dualism) we get the individual (TP:253). If we join sphere to constancy (the concern of
realism) the result is what is understood by the schema (TP:253). Joining the individual
to  flux  (the  concern  of  dualism)  the  result  is  Bildung,  which  is  "the  content  of  all
history" (TP:253). For Schlegel, the indifference point of mathematics and history is
physics  as  physics  can  demonstrate  the  same  things  as  mathematics  and  history
(TP:253).  If  we join the schema and the individual  we get  a  phenomenon.  Bildung
combined with sphere becomes epoch. Joining the ideal with constructing gives us an
approximating  constructing,  or  in  other  words,  experimenting.  Adding  symbol  to
characterising (the method of history) gives us interpretation. What does this get us? "all
of these concepts now accord with physics" (TP:253). We have arrived at the method of
physics,  experimentation,  and  as  we  also  saw,  physics  is  the  indifference  point  of
mathematics  and  history.  Going  back  a  step  further,  mathematics  and  history  were
derived from dualism and realism. Going a further step back idealism was found to be
the indifference point between dualism and realism (TP:254). In this way science is
derived from idealism, and "physics is the first among the sciences, because all science
is  natural  science"  (TP:254).  The  only  difference  between  the  two  is  that  "the
philosopher  (in  idealism)  is  concerned  with  the  minimum  and  the  maximum,  and
physics with the finite  parts  that lie between reality and the elements in an infinite
progression of proportions" (TP:254).
Schlegel now moves on to the method of philosophy, and constructs this in a
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similar way to physics. He begins with four elements of philosophy which we already
have established. These are scepticism, enthusiasm, the absolute, and reality (TP:255).
If we add scepticism to reality we get experimenting. Enthusiasm added to the absolute
gives us circularity as the direction of the method of philosophy. (TP:256). Schlegel
adds, the elements of the method of philosophy are analysis, synthesis, and abstraction.
Abstraction added to analysis  gives us the concept  of the discursive,  while analysis
added to abstraction gives us the concept of the intuitive (TP:256). The discursive added
to  synthesis  gives  us  reflection,  while  the  intuitive  added  to  synthesis  gives  us
speculation (TP:256). If we then add these two, reflection and speculation, we get the
allegory (TP:256).  Schlegel adds that reflection and speculation are the forms of all
thought  and  allegory  is  therefore  the  result  of  all  thought  (TP:256).  If  we add the
discursive to the intuitive we get terminology, the expression of contradictory concepts
such as  intellectual  intuition.  The middle  point  between  producing and  deducing  is
construction,  the  method  of  mathematics.  The  middle  point  of  demonstrating  and
defining is characterising, the method of history. Finally, the middle point of scepticism
and reality is experimenting, the method of physics. At this point we have returned to
where we started,  by following the elements produced by Schlegel's  construction of
physics we have come back to our starting point, physics. As Schlegel writes, "so we are
again at the same place where we began, that is, at our goal" (TP:257).
Schlegel continues with some more constructions. The infinite brought together
with  consciousness  becomes  infinite  consciousness  or  the  concept  of  thinking.
Consciousness brought together with the infinite becomes a conscious infinity or the
concept of a deity (TP:262). The first middle concept we found was reality. If thinking
is brought together with reality under the condition of the ur-element consciousness we
get a real thinking with consciousness, or knowledge. If the deity is brought together
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with reality under  the condition of  infinity we get  a  real  deity with infinity,  that  is
nature. Schlegel therefore declares, "the infinite task of nature is to realize the deity"
(TP:262). In addition, it  is also impossible to think anything other than the deity, so
thinking is necessarily also divination (TP:262). Consciousness brought together with
nature conditioned with knowledge is reflection, while knowledge brought together with
the infinite conditioned with nature is speculation (TP:262). Divination must therefore
be the midpoint of reflection and speculation, the two possible forms of thought, where
reflection  is  the  standpoint  of  Fichte  and  speculation  is  the  standpoint  of  Spinoza
(TP:263).  Schlegel  ends  with  the  claim that  the  aim of  philosophy is  both  to  join
together the infinite and consciousness such that any separation would be an illusion as
well  joining  together  the  philosophies  of  reflection  and  speculation  in  divination
(TP:264-6).
Schlegel and Frank on Realism
As with the other Frühromantiker Frank ascribes to Schlegel a basic position of
realism in opposition to idealism, characterised by the thesis that "self-being owes its
existence to a transcendent foundation, which does not leave itself to be dissolved into
the  immanence  of  consciousness"  (Frank,  2004,  p.178).  As  we've  seen  Frank  also
defines realism as the conviction that “that which has being … cannot be traced back to
determinations of our consciousness” while “ontological realism can be expressed by
the thesis that reality exists independently of our consciousness” and “epistemological
realism consists  in  the thesis  that  we do not  possess adequate knowledge of  reality
(Frank, 2004, p.28). If Frank's characterisation of Schlegel is correct then it would tick
all of these boxes. However, it is at the general definition of realism that Frank's reading
falters, and this precisely because of the primacy of both the infinite and consciousness
in Schlegel. Undoubtedly for Schlegel the ground of consciousness is the infinite, he
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writes in his lectures that because we can never abstract away that which posits the
infinite, that “consciousness is, as it were, a phenomenon of the infinite” (TP:243). In
addition, the infinite is transcendent to consciousness insofar as consciousness and the
infinite are the ur-elements of philosophy which can never be abstracted away from
each other.  However,  it  is  just  this  point  which  goes  against  Frank's  interpretation.
Neither the infinite nor consciousness can be abstracted from each other because the
infinite is as much dependent on consciousness as consciousness is on the infinite. This
is because consciousness is the sole predicate of the infinite while the infinite is the sole
object of consciousness (TP:244). Both are equally primary and both gain their validity
through the other, standing in a Wechselerweis, an alternating proof wherein these two
ur-elements of philosophy reciprocally prove, depend upon, and determine each other.
That  Schlegel  demands  that  philosophy  begin  with  a  Wechselwirkung and  that  the
lectures begin with infinity and consciousness as its ur-elements is no accident. Frank
cannot be right in his classification of Schlegel therefore. First of all, it is not simply
that 'Being cannot be traced back to determinations of our consciousness' since Being's
existence  is  in  no  way  primary  to,  and  in  fact  is  in  some  sense  dependent  on,
consciousness. Second of all, and on the basis of the same point, it is not the case that
reality exists independent of consciousness since reality lies in the middle of the infinite
and consciousness. With these two points covered Frank's attribution of epistemological
realism to Schlegel based the conviction that we do not posses 'adequate knowledge of
reality,' also falls away as it is a result of Schlegel's scepticism rather than a feature of
his realism.
A small problem for Schlegel does arise out of this however. As we've seen the
elements  of  all  reality  are  consciousness  and  infinite  with  reality  occupying  the
indifference point between the two (TP:244). The question now arises, in what way is
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Schlegel consistent with the aim of the Frühromantiker to be monists? If the infinite and
consciousness are irreducible elements of philosophy then have we not just achieved a
dualism?  For  Schlegel  this  is  a  result  of  our  epistemological  position.  That  we are
unable to  comprehend the absolute  within which all  oppositions  would disappear  is
'trivially true' from the fact that our knowledge is always conditioned. However, that
Schlegel takes there to be such a primal something is clear from his fragment “there is
no dualism without primacy” (Id:73). That the dualism we do find is merely a result of
the  epistemological  context  we  find  ourselves  in  becomes  from his  statement  that
natural science will “never find a higher point to attach itself to than dualism,” and that
this is the “highest form of illusion” (own emphasis) (TP:246). That we find dualism to
be so basic is therefore merely another feature of our epistemological lack.
There is one instance in Schlegel's lectures which initially seems to be telling for
Schlegel's relation to idealism and realism. This is when Schlegel constructs natural
science out of idealism. As I mentioned above the two elements of idealism are in the
lectures dualism and realism (TP:251). These in turn refer to Fichte and Spinoza. Does
this mean that Schlegel thinks philosophy can be subsumed under idealism? Or does it
mean that idealism in this instance means something different or new than what we
would classically consider idealism? I suggest he means the latter. The idealism which
subsumes and consists in dualism and realism is, I take it, the type of philosophy linked
to criticism and critical philosophy which Schlegel is trying to reshape. Several factors
indicate this. First of all, why the opposition between dualism and realism? This seems
odd at best since classically it has been realism and idealism which are opposed and not
dualism and realism. Second of all, there are several places in which Schlegel describes
idealism and realism as separate moments in our longing for the infinite and for absolute
knowledge,  moments  in  which  realism is  not  subsumed  under  idealism but  stands
86
alongside it. In his  Dialogue on Poesy,  Schlegel's character Ludoviko calls for a new
mythology based on the failure of poetry to form a cohesive unity and call for a new
mythology in order to enable poetry to achieve this (DoP:183). This mythology, claims
Ludoviko, must be created out of the “innermost depths of the spirit as if out of itself,”
in other words, this mythology must be based in idealism (DoP:183). However, this
merely forms the beginning of this mythology for now “idealism must go outside of
itself in one way or another in order to be able to return to itself and to remain what it is.
Therefore, a new and equally unbounded realism must and will emerge out of the womb
of idealism” (DoP:184).31 Another factor is found in Schlegel's fragments, in which he
writes that “all philosophy is idealism,” adding that “where philosophy stops, poetry has
to begin,” and “there exists no true realism except that of poetry” (Id:48, 96). In fact,
“realism will never again be able to appear in the shape of either philosophy or even a
system” (DoP:185). Lastly, Schlegel's rejection of idealism as it was practised before
him is made clear when he asks what philosophical system would be useful for the poet
and  discounts  idealism on  the  basis  that  a  philosophy useful  for  the  poet  can  not
transform the real  into illusion (AF:168).  With this  in  mind,  we should be wary of
characterising Schlegel as an idealist based on one instance of his terminology. The fact
that idealism and realism are two separate moments in the quest for absolute knowledge
speaks more towards their equal importance than towards a favouring of one over the
other. 
Schlegel and Beiser on Absolute Idealism
This  question of  idealism in  Schlegel  brings  us  into the territory of  Beiser's
interpretation of Schlegel and the  Frühromantiker. Although we have already rejected
Beiser's characterisation of the  Frühromantiker on the basis of their rejection of the
31 For a more in-depth discussion of Romanticisms' new mythology see (Bowie, 1990)
87
possibility of absolute knowledge, which is repeated in Schlegel, it is interesting to note
that the organicist idealist ascription of Schlegel might not be correct in itself either.
From this characterisation we are mostly interested in two features. Firstly, that Schlegel
has an organicist conception of the universe, meaning he takes the ideal and real, and
indeed the objective and the subjective, to only differ quantitatively insofar “both are
differing degrees of organization and development of a single rational activity, which
acts through constantly dividing what is one and uniting what is divided” (Beiser, 2003,
p.70). Secondly, that the universe is dependent upon an absolute intelligence which is
the “rational principle or archetype active in all things, the idea of all ideas” (Beiser,
2008, p.459). 
It is uncertain whether Schlegel would identify himself as an absolute idealist in
this manner. It has not been suggested by any of the material covered so far and Beiser's
referencing leaves much to be desired. There is however an instance in which Schlegel
suggests that he does not hold this view. This appears in Schlegel's essay Fichte's Basic
Characteristics of the Present Age in which Schlegel responds to Fichte's criticism of
the fanaticism of his contemporaries, and discusses the nature of natural philosophy and
two possible and distinct views of the absolute. Towards the end of the essay Schlegel
makes a clarification in the midst of an example. He clarifies that “the term 'reason,' in
the parlance of the new philosophy, is admittedly used there as something like 'dwelling
in  the  realm of  the  idea”  (FBC:117).  This  phrase  seems  to  bring  us  right  into  the
Platonic heritage which Beiser takes Schlegel to be a part of. Schlegel then makes the
remark  that  “the  author,  indeed  to  a  greater  extent  that  one  would  expect,  is  in
agreement with the thinking of this so-called age” (FBC:117). If Schlegel is referring to
himself  as  the  author  of  this  essay,  then  this  gives  some  force  to  Beiser's
characterisation,  as  this  would  be  an  admission  by Schlegel  in  the  belief  in  some
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rational principle guided by Platonic ideas. Two things tell against Schlegel being the
author referred to. First of all, Schlegel writes that “he [the author] generally arrives at
such views only after long, artificial detours,” which would be an odd self-description
(FBC:118). Secondly, he later writes that “this should be proof enough that Fichte is
very much caught in the age that he sets out to characterize” (FBC:118). We therefore
learn that the author who is to an unexpected degree in agreement of the thinking of the
age is the very same Fichte who is caught in the age that he sets out to characterise.
Insofar as Schlegel rejects that he takes reason to mean what Fichte does, it can not
simply be that Schlegel is the Platonic vitalist which Beiser takes him to be. 
Schlegel on Idealism and Realism
So what can we say about Schlegel's relation to idealism and realism? First of all
we've  become more  familiar  with what  Schlegel  takes  idealism to  be.  It  is  not  the
absolute  and  archetypal  idealism  which  Beiser  ascribes  to  Schlegel. Rather,  a
philosophy based in idealism seems, like Ludoviko's new mythology, simply to be an
attempt at explaining phenomena from the perspective and under the laws of spirit. On
the other end of the spectrum, realism is merely the attempt to explain and understand
everything  (particularly  the  infinite  itself)  from  the  perspective  of  the  infinite.  Of
course, this is impossible for finite human beings. This is why allegory and wit must
step in to represent the unity and unrepresentability of the infinite as moments of irony,
and it is also why “there exists no true realism except that of poetry” (Id:96).
Interestingly enough, it seems that what at first glance appeared to have the least
to do with Schlegel's relation to idealism and realism now lays the foundation for our
understanding of this relation. These are the sceptical conclusions Schlegel draws from
the finitude of our perspective. Philosophy can not guarantee the success of its attempt
based on some absolutely certain first principle and a sure-fire method. What it can do is
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produce  a  series  of  attempts  at  representing  whatever  phenomenon  it  is  currently
directed at such that relative to itself unity is achieved while relative to rest of the world
it  stands  as  a  contradiction.  Every  perspective  is  partial  and  every  philosopheme
represents an attempt at unifying that which will never be comprehensibly unified. Two
such  perspectives  are  idealism  and  realism,  concerned  with  consciousness  and  the
infinite respectively. Philosophy, as idealism, explains things from the perspective of
spirit and its laws, while realism, as poetry, explains things from the unity and infinitude
of  the  absolute.  Being  is  that  which  underlies  each  contradiction  and  each  partial
perspective. Between idealism and realism, between consciousness and the infinite, lies
all of reality, such that the ur-elements of reality, consciousness and the infinite, the
perspectives of idealism and realism, stand together, are only comprehensible through
the other, and reciprocally determine and prove the other, standing in a Wechselwirkung.
In this way, neither can subsume or replace the other but both are necessary and our
standpoint should be one that encompasses both since reality is, after all, a product of
both of their respective starting points.
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Conclusion
We have now gone through the three major philosophical writers of the early
German romantic movement, Hölderlin, Novalis, and Schlegel, in order to show that, in
spite of Manfred Frank and Frederick C. Beiser's realist and idealist interpretations, we
should  interpret  these  philosophers  as  finding  a  middle  path  between  idealism and
realism.
We  began  by  looking  at  realism  and  idealism  in  Hölderlin.  After  making
apparent  that  it  was  indeed Hölderlin's  aim to find a way to combine idealism and
realism  we  looked  at  the  major  features  of  Hölderlin's  philosophy  and  how  these
developed out of the foundations laid in his short essay  “Über Urtheil und Seyn” in
which Hölderlin argues that absolute Being cannot be attributed to either objectivity or
subjectivity alone,  since both stand in a reciprocal relation to each other,  and Being
must therefore be conceived as a foundation transcendent to both. From this Hölderlin
developed  arguments  against  our  ability  to  know this  absolute,  the  necessity  of  an
infinite approximation, the expression of this process of approximation in the eccentric
path  of  Hyperion,  and  its  completion  in  tragic  poetry.  Before  rejecting  Beiser's
characterisation  of  the  Frühromantiker  as  absolute  idealists  on  the  basis  of  their
rejection of the possibility of absolute knowledge which is an essential element of the
movement of absolute idealism, we looked at Frank's realist interpretation and found it
to be lacking in several respects. Not only do his definitions prejudge the issue against
Hölderlin's attempt, but his identification ignores the possibility of Hölderlin attempting
to fuse idealism and realism in accordance with Kant's antinomies, as well as resting on
asymmetrical relation between idealism and realism, and consciousness and Being, that
precludes  the  identification  of  Hölderlin  as  a  realist  based  only on  his  rejection  of
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idealism.  Most  importantly  however,  Frank's  characterisation  rests  on  a
misidentification of what reality consists in for Hölderlin. As we saw, it is only with the
opposition  of  the  equiprimordial  subject  and  object  that  the  reality  truly  arises  for
Hölderlin,  such  that  reality  can  neither  be  said  to  be  entirely  transcendent  to,  or
independent from, consciousness, which is the basis on which Frank identifies Hölderlin
as  a  realist.  Instead,  Hölderlin  provides  a  standpoint  which  combines  idealism and
realism, and since this was his self-proclaimed aim, we should therefore read him as
such.
We then looked at Novalis' idealism and realism. We began with excerpts from
the texts in which Novalis makes clear his aim of combining idealism and realism. We
began by looking at  the  nature  of  philosophy in face of  and along with  the  strong
sceptical  conclusions  presented  in  the  Fichte  Studies.  Like  Hölderlin,  Novalis  also
presents arguments against the possibility of knowledge of Being itself. In Novalis' case
these are based on reflection's inability to represent identity, the reversal that occurs in
reflection,  and  the  conditioned  knowledge  it  offers  that  stands  opposed  to  the
unconditioned nature of the absolute. We then moved on to the later writings of Novalis,
namely his assorted fragments and  Das Allgemeine Brouillon.  We then drew out the
apparent tension between this work and the Fichte Studies, most notably in his notion of
magical idealism. However, scepticism was shown to be as much of a part of Novalis'
position during these later years, primarily because of the continued attachment to the
notion  of  infinite  approximation.  We  then  moved  on  to  Beiser  and  Frank's
interpretations.  First  we  found  that  Beiser's  absolute  idealist  interpretation,  still
unacceptable on the basis of Novalis' rejection of the possibility of absolute knowledge,
also  did  not  adequately take  into  account  the  tentative  status  of  claims  to  absolute
knowledge that bar us from entirely ascribing an organicism to Novalis. On the other
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hand, Frank's account was again found lacking insofar as it did not take into account
Novalis' aim of fusing idealism and realism. We then established a reading of Novalis
that did take this into account, stressing his relativisation of idealism and realism as
primary elements of a philosophy which need completion through each other, and found
that their necessary combination established Novalis as a philosopher who both can and
should be interpreted as finding a middle ground between idealism and realism.
Lastly, we turned to idealism and realism in Schlegel. We again began with some
excerpts that made it clear that Schlegel's philosophical project was, at least in part, to
find a way to combine idealism and realism. We then went through the major meta-
philosophical aspects of Schlegel's philosophy, including his  anti-foundationalism, the
notion  of  philosophy as  beginning the  middle,  the  cyclical  form of  philosophy,  the
coherence  model  of  truth,  the  Wechselwirkung as  the  starting  point  of  philosophy,
philosophy as infinite approximation, the place of scepticism and mysticism, and the
epistemological role of irony, allegory, and wit. Then we moved on to some notes from
Schlegel's  Introduction to the Transcendental Philosophy lectures to see how Schlegel
attempted to base a philosophy on these meta-philosophical principles, paying particular
attention to the establishment of the infinite and consciousness as the ur-elements of
philosophy. With this in mind we turned to Frank's interpretation and found that, insofar
as  the  infinite  and  consciousness,  or  realism  and  idealism  in  Schlegel's  eyes,  are
equiprimordial,  he  can  not  be  characterised  as  a  realist.  We  also  rejected  Beiser's
interpretation both on the now familiar terms of Schlegel's rejection of the possibility of
absolute knowledge and on the basis of his comments on Fichte remaining within 'realm
of the idea.' We then found that, instead of being able to classify Schlegel either as a
realist  or  idealist,  insofar  as  Schlegel  takes the infinite  and consciousness to  be the
principles of philosophy which it is our task to combine and out of whose conjunction
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reality arises, Schlegel exemplifies exactly the kind of idealist-realist  philosophy we
would expect from someone whose aim it is to combine the two.
Having gone through Hölderlin, Novalis, and Schlegel in turn, summarised the
major  elements  of  their  philosophy,  shown how none  of  the  three  can,  due  to  the
equiprimordiality of the subjective and the objective, be interpreted as either an idealist
or realist, and rejected any absolute idealist readings, as well as given a reading of these
philosophers consistent with their attempt to combine idealism and realism, I conclude
that we both can and should interpret Hölderlin,  Novalis,  and Schlegel  as finding a
middle path between idealism and realism.
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